The Effect of Controlling Shareholders on the Properties of Earnings
| Project/Area Number |
23730448
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Research Field |
Accounting
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| Research Institution | Seijo University (2012-2013)
Nagoya University of Commerce & Business (2011) |
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Principal Investigator |
AOKI Yasuharu 成城大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (50553137)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2011 – 2013
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2013)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,510,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥810,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
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| Keywords | 支配株主 / コーポレートガバナンス / 利益情報の有用性 / 保守主義 / 配当政策 / 最大株主 / 少数株主 / ペイアウト / 利益の質 / 利益調整 / 裁量的会計発生高 |
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| Research Abstract |
This research examines the effect of controlling shareholders on (1) earnings informativeness, (2) accounting conservatism, and (3) dividend policy. The first study suggests that earnings informativeness is positively associated with ownership by the largest shareholder on the whole, but an inverted U-shaped relationship is observed for the firms whose largest shareholder is an outsider. The second paper reveals a negative relationship between ownership by the largest shareholder and accounting conservatism, whose strength increases with the existence of director overlap and the relative size of the investee firm to the largest shareholder firm. The third paper finds that the level of dividend payments and the relationship between ownership concentration and dividends depend on whether the largest shareholder is a company manager or another corporation.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(6 results)
