The mechanism that explains sanctioning behaviors as a solution to the problem of social order
Project/Area Number |
24330184
|
Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
|
Allocation Type | Partial Multi-year Fund |
Section | 一般 |
Research Field |
Social psychology
|
Research Institution | Hokkaido University |
Principal Investigator |
|
Project Period (FY) |
2012-04-01 – 2017-03-31
|
Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2016)
|
Budget Amount *help |
¥19,240,000 (Direct Cost: ¥14,800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥4,440,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥5,460,000 (Direct Cost: ¥4,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,260,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥4,420,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,020,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥4,550,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,050,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥4,810,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,110,000)
|
Keywords | 社会的交換 / 進化 / ゲーム理論 / 社会系心理学 |
Outline of Final Research Achievements |
Large-scale cooperation between unrelated individuals is pervasive only in human societies. The most well-known mechanism to make mutual cooperation possible is sanctioning. Previous experimental studies have shown that people engage in sanctioning even when it is costly. By reexamining such “verified sanctioning behaviors”, the current study showed that sanctioning behaviors do not reflect individual preferences directly. Rather, they are heavily context-dependent. Furthermore, the function of sanctioning is not necessarily the direct effect of transformation of incentive structure. Rather, the joint effect of sanctioning and assortative interaction may make the belief that sanctioning exists reality.
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Report
(6 results)
Research Products
(8 results)