| Project/Area Number |
24530201
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Reitaku University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
SAITO Masayuki 東京経済大学, 経営学部, 専任講師 (80434215)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2012-04-01 – 2015-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2014)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,550,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,050,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥2,210,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥510,000)
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| Keywords | 腐敗 / 汚職 / 公共調達 / 官僚行動 / 賄賂 / 国家統治の質 / ガバナンス / 腐敗防止メカニズム / 国家統治 / 移行経済 / 効率性 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
From FY2012 to FY2015, we analyze the economics of corruption by (i) applying auction theory and (ii) imperfect competition model. We also commentary on the Japanese translated book, “Economic Gangster” to the general public.
For the first approach, we have the following results: Mizoguchi and Quyen (Pacific Economic Review, 2014) analyze a corruption in the context of public procurement in which the contracting officer is corrupt. The corrupt bureaucrat takes bribes to misreport on quality and passes on bid information about the rival’s bid to the bribe-giving firm so as to enable it to revise its bid and win the contract. Our analysis suggests that when the firms serve only the internal market, the public project is realized at low quality and inflated prices. However, when the firms are also allowed to sell the product they develop for the internal market in a foreign market, the auction is ex post efficient.
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