The role of communication in the design of incentives
Project/Area Number |
24530208
|
Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
|
Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
Section | 一般 |
Research Field |
Economic theory
|
Research Institution | Kinki University |
Principal Investigator |
|
Project Period (FY) |
2012-04-01 – 2016-03-31
|
Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2015)
|
Budget Amount *help |
¥2,080,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥480,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
|
Keywords | インセンティブ / 組織 / 提携交渉 / 人事の経済学 / 契約理論 / 昇進 / 学習 / 自信過剰 / 賃金交渉 / 不完備情報 / 企業組織 / チーム生産 / チープトーク / 提携形成 |
Outline of Final Research Achievements |
I study the problem of information learning and incentives inside organizations under the framework of incomplete contracts. First, I identify an organizational form with a rule of ex-post bargaining and show that the choice of organizational form is affected by the incentives of human capital investment. Second, I analyze wage negotiations between one employer and two workers. I show that how the complementarity of workers and the externalities to their wage contracts affect the pattern and the order of wage bargaining. Third, I examine the promotion decision when the employer and employees have different prior beliefs over employees' ability. I show that employees' overconfidence is a necessary condition for a delayed promotion and the attractiveness of the late promotion relative to the early promotion increases as the precision of the employer's prior belief increases.
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Report
(5 results)
Research Products
(3 results)