| Project/Area Number |
24530578
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Accounting
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| Research Institution | Meiji University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2012-04-01 – 2015-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2014)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,340,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥540,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
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| Keywords | 監査難民 / 新興企業 / 監査拒否 / ゲーム理論 / 経済実験 / 損害賠償責任 / 監査契約 / IPO市場 / 監査人 / 監査契約の拒否 / 実験 / 実験会計学 / 監査人の独立性 / 監査法人 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
The purpose of my research is to coduct experimental investigations on following client rejection issues based on the game theoretical settings. Big audit firms are reluctant to accept an audit offer from clients with going concern problems and it is small audit firms that accept this offer. Their independence is at stake. My research demonstrates that auditors with less market power don't compromise their independence, even if their clients are investment-averse. Client rejection leads to a huge economic loss and ultimately a market failure, through preventing high promising entrepreneurs from having access to capital markets. My research indicates that the stricteness of legal liability does not have much impact om client rejection nor investor's decision. Howerver, it suggests that the high frequency of the bad type entrepreneur should produce mutual defection between auditors and investors, that is, less frequent great effort at evaluationg clients and less frequent investment.
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