Robustness and Fragility on Financial Networks
| Project/Area Number |
24730278
|
|---|
| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
|
| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
|---|
| Research Field |
Public finance/Monetary economics
|
|---|
| Research Institution | Waseda University |
|---|
Principal Investigator |
|
|---|
| Project Period (FY) |
2012-04-01 – 2016-03-31
|
| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2015)
|
| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,120,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥720,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
|
|---|
| Keywords | 金融システム / 銀行預金 / 正直な選好 / メカニズムデザイン / 繰り返しゲーム / ミクロ経済学 / ゲーム理論 / 銀行預金制度 / 行動経済学 / 社会心理学 / 預金契約 / 取付け / 世代重複モデル / くり返しゲーム / 国際情報交換 |
|---|
| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
Financial systems can be down by people’s “bad” behavior. This study investigates the possibility of the prevention of financial-system-down by using theoretical models of banking, mechanism design, and repeated games. I show that a deposit contract that uses preference for honesty is effective for the prevention of bank runs by a single bank. If there are multiple banks in a market and they are long-lived players, they accommodate assets each other as their optimal behavior.
|
Report
(5 results)
Research Products
(3 results)
