| Project/Area Number |
25285085
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
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| Allocation Type | Partial Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic policy
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| Research Institution | Hosei University |
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Principal Investigator |
XU Peng 法政大学, 比較経済研究所, 教授 (60247111)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
MATSUI Kenji 神戸大学, 経営学研究科, 准教授 (20345474)
MORITA Hatsuru 東北大学, 法学研究科, 教授 (40292817)
ARIKAWA Yasuhiro 早稲田大学, 商学学術院, 准教授 (90308156)
TANAKA Wataru 東京大学, 社会科学研究所, 教授 (00282533)
MIYAZAKI Kenji 法政大学, 経済学部, 教授 (10308009)
TAKEDA Koichi 法政大学, 経済学部, 教授 (40328919)
TAKEGUCHI Keisuke 法政大学, 経済学部, 教授 (80386333)
TAKECHI Kazutaka 法政大学, 経済学部, 教授 (80386341)
TAKAHASHI Hidetomo 法政大学, 比較経済研究所, 准教授 (90583659)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2013-04-01 – 2016-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2015)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥17,160,000 (Direct Cost: ¥13,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥3,960,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥5,850,000 (Direct Cost: ¥4,500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,350,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥5,850,000 (Direct Cost: ¥4,500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,350,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥5,460,000 (Direct Cost: ¥4,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,260,000)
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| Keywords | 所有構造 / 株主総会 / 株主アクティビズム / 個人投資家 / ストック・オプション / 株主との会話 / ＭＢＯ / 情報開示 / 企業統治 / 総会の基準日 / 社外取締役 / 個人株主 / 株式インデックス / メインバンク / ストックオプション / 投資家との対話 / 振替価格 / 経済事情 / 国際企業統治 / 独立取締役 / 議決権行使 / 役員報酬 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
From an international view, we investigate the recent development in corporate governance in Japan such as shareholder meeting, shareholders activism, management buyouts, poison pills and post-performance, the effects of foreign institutional shareholders on information disclosure, and, firm-bank relationship. Though Japanese corporate law provides shareholders powerful authorities, shareholder activism is weak in Japan in comparison with other Asian countries. In particular, our case study shows that a poison pill approved under interlocking shareholding against an activist led to poor post-performance. This suggests that interlocking ownership isolates managers from pressures of capital market. Our legal studies provide several proposals for improving Japan’s corporate governance. We have presented numerous papers in conferences. And several articles are published in journals as well as in books.
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