| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,030,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥930,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
This research project conducts several empirical studies on the roles played by institutional investors in Japan’s corporate governance. The results indicate that institutional investors can contribute to the enhancement of firm value by either taking over inefficient companies, or by intervention via the legally binding shareholder proposals. In contrast, it is found that stock market reacts negatively to companies adopting anti-takeover provisions that deter such intervention by outside shareholders. However, such shareholder intervention is constrained for banks which are highly regulated and thus protected by the government. The empirical results, instead, show that board-level governance such as risk-management is important in disciplining bank behaviors.
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