| Project/Area Number |
26285052
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
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| Allocation Type | Partial Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic policy
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| Research Institution | Kindai University (2016)
Tohoku University (2014-2015) |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
中島 賢太郎 東北大学, 経済学研究科(研究院), 准教授 (60507698)
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| Research Collaborator |
KAWAI Kei カリフォルニア大学バークレイ校, 経済学部, 助教授
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| Project Period (FY) |
2014-04-01 – 2017-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2016)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥11,700,000 (Direct Cost: ¥9,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥2,700,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥2,340,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥540,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥4,420,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,020,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥4,940,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,140,000)
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| Keywords | カルテル・入札談合 / 競争政策 / 公共政策 / カルテル / 公共事業の入札 / 経済政策 / 談合 / 公共入札 / 計量分析 / 入札談合 / 公共工事 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We documented evidence of widespread bidding rings among construction firms in procurement auctions for public construction projects. We use data that covers most of the construction projects procured by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transportation from years 2003 through 2006. By examining rebids that occur for auctions when all bids fail to meet the secret reserve price, we identify collusion using ideas similar to regression discontinuity. The approach we propose in this paper requires only bid data and does not rely on parametric assumptions on the primitives of the model. Our approach can also be useful to law enforcement agencies in a variety of settings given that rebidding is commonly observed.
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