Shareholder Derivative Suits and inspection right: Comparative analysis of the system in Japan and the US

Research Project

Project/Area Number	26380140
Research Category	Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
Allocation Type	Multi-year Fund
Section	一般
Research Field	Civil law
Research Institution	Doshisha University
Principal Investigator	Kamata Kaoruko 同志社大学, 法学部, 教授 (50336822)
Project Period (FY)	2014-04-01 – 2018-03-31
Project Status	Completed (Fiscal Year 2017)
Budget Amount *help	¥2,990,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥690,000) Fiscal Year 2017: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000) Fiscal Year 2016: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000) Fiscal Year 2015: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000) Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Keywords	株主閲覧権 / アメリカ会社法 / 株主代表訴訟制度 / 弁護士 / 開示免除特権 / 株主の閲覧権 / 米国の裁判例 / 株主代表訴訟 / 株主の情報収集
Outline of Final Research Achievements	The purpose of this study was to determine whether Japanese shareholder inspection right system should reform in the future. Here I compare the system and cases in Japan and the US. In analyzing Delaware cases, I recognized that shareholder must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that there exists a credible basis to find probable corporate wrongdoing. A mere statement of a purpose to investigate possible mismanagement or wrongdoing will not entitle a shareholder to inspection relief. Because standard of review about credible basis is not established enough in Japan, showing such American standard in detail is significant. I also analyze Delaware cases about attorney-client privilege when the Corporation is a client. It is significant to analyze the balance between shareholder need to get information and corporation's need to keep confidentiality document and the requirements to inspect confidentiality documents.