Measuring the degree of market power for privatized airports with non-aviation activities and economic regulation
Project/Area Number |
26380312
|
Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
|
Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
Section | 一般 |
Research Field |
Economic policy
|
Research Institution | Keio University |
Principal Investigator |
Tanabe Katsumi 慶應義塾大学, 商学部(三田), 教授 (90438995)
|
Project Period (FY) |
2014-04-01 – 2018-03-31
|
Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2017)
|
Budget Amount *help |
¥3,770,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥870,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
|
Keywords | 着陸料 / 空港間競争 / 非航空系 / ラムゼイ料金 / 料金規制 / 空港 / 二面性市場 / 経済的規制 / ネスティッドロジット / MMC / トランスログ費用関数 / 民営化空港 / 集計需要関数 / 市場支配力 / アクセシビリティ / ベルトラン競争 |
Outline of Final Research Achievements |
This study explores whether aviation charge regulation is necessary at privatized airports. We employ a structural model of airline competition in the Japanese domestic air passenger market. We find that airports without integration set nine times higher than current aviation charge. When airports integrate the non-aviation sector, they tend to set lower aviation charges by 5.6-20.5 %. Consequently, non-aviation charges are lowered. Competition among airports also tends to lower aviation charges. Nonetheless, single-till regulation dominates dual-till regulation at non-congested airports, regarding welfare maximization. We find that aviation charges will remain high if airports maximize profits, whether they are integrated with highly profitable non-aviation companies and airport competition or not. Regarding mergers between airports, it is possible that the total surplus will be reduced if the airports are not complementary but competing.
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Report
(5 results)
Research Products
(12 results)