Trade policies implemented by segmented departments seeking self-interest
Project/Area Number |
26380340
|
Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
|
Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
Section | 一般 |
Research Field |
Economic policy
|
Research Institution | Ritsumeikan University |
Principal Investigator |
Ohkawa Takao 立命館大学, 経済学部, 教授 (10258494)
|
Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
林原 正之 追手門学院大学, 経済学部, 名誉教授 (00104901)
岡村 誠 広島大学, 社会科学研究科, 名誉教授 (30177084)
野村 良一 立命館大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (60465599)
|
Project Period (FY) |
2014-04-01 – 2017-03-31
|
Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2016)
|
Budget Amount *help |
¥2,340,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥540,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
|
Keywords | 見かけ上の目的 / 真の目的 / 縦割り行政 / 省益追求 / 公益追求 / 関税 / 補助金 / 寡占 / 部門間競争 / 貿易政策 / 私益追求 / リヴァイアサン政府 / 省益最大化 / サイロ効果 / 縦割り / 補助金政策 / 関税政策 / 長期 / 短期 / 省益 / 長期的視野 / 短期的視野 |
Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We consider a government consisting of two policy implementation departments, each of which is self-interested. We examine whether each of these departments disguises itself as a benevolent policymaker in the sense that it adopts welfare maximization as its “surface” objective to determine the policy variable, although its“true” objective is self-interest maximization under a tariff/subsidy scheme. We also examine whether an increase in the number of departments disguising themselves as welfare-maximizers improves welfare. When the cost difference between home and foreign firms is at the intermediate level, the subsidy department does not disguise itself as a benevolent policymaker, whereas the tariff department may do so. In addition, the welfare level in the partial disguise case is lower than that in the no disguise case.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(14 results)