| Project/Area Number |
26380370
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Public finance/Public economy
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| Research Institution | Keio University |
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Principal Investigator |
Terai Kimiko 慶應義塾大学, 経済学部(三田), 教授 (80350213)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2014-04-01 – 2017-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2016)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,860,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥660,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
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| Keywords | 予算 / 政治経済学 / シグナリング / 公共事業 / シーリング / 予算編成 / プリンシパル・エージェントモデル / 委任 / 分権的財政制度 / プリンシパル・エージェント問題 / インセンティブとしての予算配分 / 予算過程 / 財政赤字 / 連邦制度 / 地方分権 / 組織内予算配分 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
In my theoretical model, a person or an organization who decides the total budget is regarded as a principal, and a person or an organization allocating the budget given to him/her among programs is an agent. When the principal decides the amount of a budget depending on the agent's behavior, there may exist a time-inconsistency problem, which will generate inefficiency. Asymmetric information between the principal and the agent is another source of inefficiency.
I also composed a model in which a budget is spent on public investment. Under some conditions on utility function and production function, the agent can increase the budget he/she gets by engaging in greater corruption. A budget constraint imposed for the final period can limit corruption in each period, and induce efficient investment. Moreover, I showed that a fiscal cap on aggregate spending in the final period alone, though it may appear loose, credibly controls agents.
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