| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,730,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥630,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
While during the Cold War period, the majority of non-democratic regimes adopted single-party systems, since the fall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and Russia, dictators in hitherto single party regimes transform itself to what scholars call "electoral authoritarian regimes", where regular, competitive but unfair elections between ex-ruling single parties with newly emerged opposition becomes norm. For all recent development about the effect of political institutions, such as legislatures, parties and elections, in the dictatorships, scholars failed to develop a theory to explain why such shifts occurred, mainly because, previous works did not have a theoretical distinction between single party regimes and electoral authoritarian regimes. More specifically, what kind of benefits (and risks) do dictators gain and incur by having multiparty competitive but unfair elections? My research answered this question.
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