| Research Abstract |
1. The philosophy of Franz Brentano and his school is generally characterized as objectivistic realism. As contrasted with this, the subjectivistic tendency is represented by positivistic philosophy of science of Ernst Mach, another important figure of Austrian philosophy contemporary with Brentano. We studied the strained relation between these thoughts, with special attention to the case of Bertrand Russell, as he changed his position from phenomenalism in 1910's to neutral monism in 1920's
2. Brentano's celebrated characterization of the mental as 'intentional inexistence' and the later repudiation of his own view were studied with care. His classification of the mental phenomena and the division of the philosophical subjects on its basis were shown. On the other hand, the development of Brentano's original view about the mental, which was undertaken by Meinong in his theory of objects, was followed in its main features. The ontological, epistemological and ethical thoughts of the two philosophers were comparatively studied.
3. The debates between Meinong and Russell were reviewed, through which the former's theory of objects was examined in the light of ontology such as shared by most of the contemporary logicians. We considered why Meinong thought compelled admission of beingless objects to his theory, and how their worth should be assessed from our point of view. We also considered how Austrian and Anglo-American philosophers, such as Brentano, G. E. Moore, Russell, the New Realists et al., would respond to the propositions constituting the so-called 'subjectivist argument', and brought to light their respective positions against idealistic epistemology.
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