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研究課題名(英文) Crisis of Opportunity? European Integration and party politics at the national and EU-level in the wake of Brexit

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研究成果の概要(和文)：本プロジェクトで得られた知見は、EUの政治システムが、ブレグジットを含む過去10年間の数々の危機を泥縄で乗り越えてきた一方で、依然として未発達のままであるということである。親欧州派の後ろ盾がありながら、EUの政治システムは障害に直面し続けてきた。その一例が、2024年の欧州選挙である。この中でも多くの国政政党や加盟国の「無関心」によってEU統合の正当性は、ますます脆弱なものとなっている。さらに、欧州懐疑派は依然としてEUを「国民国家のヨーロッパ」へ導くという目標を持ち続けている。また、本プロジェクトでは、ブレグジットにおいて、欧州懐疑派勢力がどのように反EU的未来像を展開したかも明らかにした。

研究成果の学術的意義や社会的意義

I introduced two key ideas to the literature in the shape of 'transnational practice' and 'dilemma of indifference'. I was interviewed by Oita Godo Shimbun (22/2/1) and appeared in the business group newsletter EUROITA 2021.5. I have clarified European politics to students/members of the public.

研究成果の概要(英文)：The central finding of the project is that while the political system of the EU has muddled through numerous crises in the past decade, including Brexit, it continues to remain underdeveloped. Despite the backing of the pro-EU forces, opportunities to enhance the EU's political development have continued to face obstacles. One example that I elucidated was the way in which measures heralded as bolstering the Europarties, alongside a desire to give the 2024 European elections more of a European focus have failed to materialize due to 'indifference' from many national political parties/member states. As a result of these lost opportunities, the legitimacy of on-going EU integration processes remains increasingly vulnerable to increasingly vocal Eurosceptic forces whose goal is to steer the EU towards a 'Europe of Nation States'. The project also demonstrated, via a case-study of Brexit, how Eurosceptic forces could successfully deploy an anti-EU vision of the future.

研究分野：EU Studies and Comparative Politics

キーワード：European integration Europarties EPGs Euroscepticism Brexit Political integration Europe of Nation States Ever Closer Union

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## 1. 研究開始当初の背景

(1) At the time of the original application (late summer 2016) the European Union (EU) was caught up in, yet another, on-going ‘existential crisis’ stemming from Brexit. This came on the heels of the 2008 financial crisis, the rule of law/illiberal democracy crisis in Poland and Hungary, and the refugee crisis in 2015. This was also a time when, at a structural/organizational level, Bickerton *et al* claimed, not only, that a ‘crisis of trust and confidence are a perennial feature of European integration’ but also that the EU’s ‘supranational institutions’ were ‘no longer hard-wired for the pursuit of ever closer union’ (Christopher Bickerton, Dermot Hodson and Uwe Peutter, *The New Intergovernmentalism*, OUP, 2015, p.viii). Did these events constitute *a crisis* that was undermining the EU’s basic rationale of ‘political integration/ever closer union’? Or did they represent *an opportunity a la* Jean Monnet: ‘Europe will be forged in crisis and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises.’ In seeking to investigate this conundrum my thoughts were drawn to two issues that were umbilically tied: the situation of political parties at the EU level and a growing counter-narrative of Euroscepticism at the EU and national level.

a) I wondered if the ten little-known Europarties – which span the political spectrum and include 3 Eurosceptic formations – could fulfil their legal role of ‘contributing to forming European political awareness and to expressing the will of the citizens’ (Lisbon Art. 10.4). Would that help strengthen electoral participation and, simultaneously, the legitimacy of the European project? At that time, the new *Spitzenkandidaten* initiative (i.e., the indirect election of the Commission President) had had its first outing as part of the 2014 European elections. It was heralded as a tool to boost the legitimacy of the Office of Commission President as well as the President’s standing within the institutional architecture of the EU. It could not, however, disguise the fact that voter turnout in 2014 had fallen to an all-time low.

b) I also wondered if the idea of a ‘transnational representative democracy’ (Lisbon Art.10.1) was resilient enough to effectively counter a growing counter-narrative that was emanating from the electoral growth of Eurosceptic political forces at the national and EU-level? With a missionary zeal, their self-ascribed goal was to undermine the European project’s pursuit of ‘political integration/ever closer union’ and shift developments towards a ‘Europe of Nation-States’.

While much of the Eurosceptic critique was of an aspirational/rhetorical nature, it was Brexit that showed how rhetoric could be transformed into a new political reality. The referendum, with its famous slogan ‘Take Back Control’ became a Eurosceptic rallying cry and blueprint of how to successfully utilize a political and economic context to craft an appealing counter narrative. In the wake of Brexit, Eurosceptics across the bloc were gleefully predicting that other member states would soon choose to follow the UK’s example.

(2) In this context, I recalled the assertion of Jürgen Habermas that within the ‘framework of the nation-state’ certain pre-conditions were necessary for ‘the democratic self-direction of society’. One of those pre-conditions requires ‘...an effective political apparatus for the execution of collectively binding decisions.’ Habermas, J. (2003: 88), ‘Toward a Cosmopolitan Europe’, *Journal of Democracy*, 14 (4), pp.86-100. Part of that ‘democratic self-direction’, it seemed to me, necessitated both an increasing politicization of the ‘EU question’ from pro- and anti- forces alike; as well as an appropriate set of transnational initiatives from the proponents of political integration/ ‘ever closer union’ so as to bolster their narrative and ideational vision of the future. That vision could then be put to the public at the time of national and European elections. Politicization, in the words of Grande and Hutter was tied to ‘...an expansion of the scope of conflict within the political system.’ (See Hutter, Grande and Kriesi, *Politicising Europe*, CUP, 2016, p.7. *Italics in original*)

## 2. 研究の目的

(1) The goal of this project, therefore, was to produce an evidential-based study that sought to account for, and explain, differing attitudes towards political integration post-Brexit (2016). As a subset of the wider processes of EU-integration, ‘political integration’ was tied to party-political developments at the EU-level and national level. From such a vantage point, it would be necessary to look for signs that promoted or stymied those developments. This would be done by focusing on *three* events: a) the continuing post-2017 political and legal evolution of the European political parties (Europarties); b) the 2019 European election and the run-in to the 2024 election; c) the 2016 Brexit referendum and the subsequent shenanigans associated with the actualization of that decision.

(2) Calls to strengthen democracy and deliberative opportunities, at the EU level, have been a constant feature of the ‘future of Europe’ debate for decades. A key marker in that debate, via which developments can be evaluated, remains Ernst Haas’s definition of political integration from 1958: ‘Political integration is the process

whereby political actors in several, distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions process or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. The end result is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones.' Ernst Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*, Stanford University Press, 1958, p.16).

My own assumption was that the drivers of political integration were not 'no longer hard-wired for the pursuit of ever closer union', as Bickerton *et al* claimed, but were rather 'ill-equipped' for that pursuit. This obviously problematizes the prospects of ever reaching Haas's destination point. In seeking to account for that assertion, the study would go on to introduce two notions for 'what was happening' and 'why': the nature and depth of what I termed 'transnational practice' and extent of what I referred to as a 'dilemma of indifference' (see section 4 below).

(3) At a more abstract level, the project sought to evaluate the interconnectedness between 'organizational capacity and the institutional means to effectively promote and actualize an ideational vision of the future (i.e., a destination point) in the face of specific challenges.' This, therefore, necessitated thinking about the role and significance of political actors and the choices that they make and the circumstances under which such choices are made including: historical and contemporary events and the ideological drive underpinning party political forces.

(4) Analytically, I believed that an investigation of this kind lends itself to an eclectic institutionalist perspective. I needed to assess the way in which the 'ideas about political integration and resistance to such ideas' were framed/politicised, projected and utilized by both proponents and opponents. Such questions aligned with the 'discursive' variant of institutionalism (DI). DI stresses the importance of discourse and contestation over future visions, and the way in which new ideas *may* go on to shape institutions/change the status quo. In the words of Schmidt and Radaelli (2004: 207) 'Discourse... helps to overcome the structure-agency divide and, thereby, to explain the dynamics of change by lending insight into how actors in different institutional contexts with new ideas may overcome entrenched interests, institutional obstacles and cultural impediments to change.' (Vivien A Schmidt & Claudio M Radaelli (2004) 'Policy Change and Discourse in Europe: Conceptual and Methodological Issues', *West European Politics*, 27:2, 183-210.) Of course, that does not mean that they will succeed – especially if path-dependent tendencies remain strong – just that they *may*. In addition, this also has a public dynamic that needs to be accounted for. As Schmidt writes: 'Discourse is crucial for gaining not only the political support to initiate change but also the public support to maintain it.' ('The role of public discourse for social democratic reform projects in Europe', in Vivien A. Schmidt et al, *Public Discourse and Welfare State Reform*, Mets & Schilt, 2005, pp.13-47. 13).

### 3. 研究の方法

(1) In order to address the issues and questions raised in sections 1 and 2, and to ascertain what factors are causally significant, I drew primarily from qualitative approaches (see below) and to a lesser degree from quantitative sources such as election data. The project's methodological toolkit also utilized 'process tracing' which not only helps us to think about events but also obliges us to ask the 'why' and 'so what' questions. For Beach and Pedersen, it provides a '...pragmatic strategy for capturing the multiplicity of causes and linking them to outcomes that produce particular historical outcomes' (*Process-Tracing Methods*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., University of Michigan Press, 2019, p.283).

(2) An array of primary and secondary source material was collated and analyzed. Elite interviews (politicians/party officials) afforded key insights. Archival research, alongside an assessment of specialist academic and newspaper literature, allowed for the weaving together of a rich tapestry of historical and contemporary events. Think-tank reports and published work from the political foundations of the Europarties provided some of the most up-to-date research. Engaging with both the legacy media and new social media shone a light on the contested nature that surrounds much of this debate.

(3) I was also fortunate enough to attend several Europarty Congresses as a non-participant observer. This included the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats in Europe Party (ALDE-P), Amsterdam 2017; the European People's Party (EPP), Helsinki 2018 and the Party of European Socialists (PES), Berlin 2022. Such gatherings offered unprecedented opportunities to collect party documentation; engage in on-the-spot interviews; listen to debates etc. In addition, research visits to the party headquarters of the European Green Party (EGP), the European Free Alliance (EFA) and the EPP and the PES (all in Brussels) as well as visits to Dublin (2018) to interview national party officials and politicians about the benefits of being part of a Europarty and their thoughts about Brexit. Between 2020-2022, I joined several on-line events organized by the European Parliament, as well as various discussions related to the on-going negotiations associated with Brexit. Throughout the project, I also had the opportunity to meet, both formally and informally numerous academics here in Japan and abroad, as well as present my ideas and findings at conferences, workshops, and public lectures.

#### 4. 研究成果

(1) The central finding of the project is that while the political system of the EU has muddled through numerous crises in the past decade, including Brexit, it continues to remain underdeveloped. Despite the backing of the pro-EU forces (including the mainstream Europarties and the majority of the European Parliament) opportunities to enhance the EU's political development have continued to face obstacles. One example of these obstacles that I elucidated was the way in which measures heralded as bolstering the Europarties, alongside a desire to give the 2024 European elections more of a European focus, via the introduction of transnational electoral lists and a revitalized *Spitzenkandidaten* process have, to date, failed to materialize due to 'indifference' from many national political parties/member states. As a result of these lost opportunities, the legitimacy of on-going political integration remains increasingly vulnerable to Eurosceptic forces in the run-up to 2024 as they maintain their goal of seeking to steer the EU towards a 'Europe of Nation States'.

(2) In my previous *Kakenhi report* (May 2018 – Project number 26380174), I highlighted the challenges surrounding the 'developmental potential of representative democracy at the EU-level.' Little that has transpired in the last 5-to-6 years would appear to have dispelled those concerns. Indeed, an assertion that I first wrote in a blog in 2018, that the *Spitzenkandidaten* initiative was 'Withering on the vine', for example, remains (I believe) an apt metaphor. The fact that the Europarties continue to labor under numerous constraints that emasculate their role and significance, and developmental potential was the basis of my 2022 paper 'What fate bestows the European Political Parties (Europarties)? The Challenges of Democracy Building at the EU-Level', *Asia-Pacific Journal of EU-Studies*, 20(2), pp.1-24. While the paper recognized the positive impact stemming from legal changes, backed by both the Juncker Commission and the von der Leyen Commission between 2017-2020, it remained doubtful about the resonance of these measures beyond the 'Brussels village'. There was little indication that these measures were resulting in increased linkages with EU citizens.

The paper went on to stress the importance of 'transnational practice' and the consequences of a 'dilemma of indifference'. In terms of 'transnational practice', I argued that proponents view it as relating '...to measures/developments that seek to enhance the ability of the Europarties to undertake their operational and day-to-day roles.' In contrast, opponents view it as something '...that needs to be resisted/watered down in some shape or form.' (Ibid., p.5). I defined 'dilemma of indifference' as 'rhetorical support for something without necessarily intending to actualize it' (ibid., p.7). I also argued that 'Indifference' has a corrosive quality that reinforces a sense of dismissiveness towards the Europarties. This leaves them, *at best*, languishing as a peripheral concern for their national member parties. It was shown how this scenario can go as far as a farcical situation whereby national member parties are excused constantly for contravening the norms and values of the Europarty.

(2a) Low levels of citizen engagement. The persistence of low levels of citizen engagement with EU-level politics is a well-known problem. Here, the project touched upon the almost non-existent sustained and meaningful linkages between EU-citizens and the Europarties. Essentially only the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats (ALDE-P) offers a meaningful form of individual membership. Even so, they still only have approximately 1000 individual members. It also highlighted the oft-cited, and continuing, low levels of electoral participation - despite the sizable increase in 2019 from 42.5 percent five years earlier to 50.6 percent. I argued that such deficiencies leave the EU vulnerable to accusations that its democratic legitimacy remains 'hollow'.

In *Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy*, (Verso, 2013) Peter Mair questioned the opportunity that EU-citizens had for 'meaningful input' which meant that 'effective electoral accountability [was] exceptionally limited' (p.109). He went on to say that the political system is '...a system that is... more or less impermeable as far as voters are concerned...' (p.125). Even if such remarks are overblown, they should not be ignored. The recent overnight electoral rise of the Farmer-Citizen Party (BBB) in the Netherlands (March 2023) provides a pertinent example of how quickly things can change. Although ostensibly a domestic phenomenon, the policies which the BBB stood against emanate from the EU's Climate Change Strategy. Such political shocks are a reminder of the need for the EU to build a reservoir of popular legitimacy that it can draw from, especially when it needs member states to implement controversial and contested legislation.

(3) In the wake of the 2019 European election, I was able to map out the ideological underpinnings and policy priorities of the European Parliamentary Groups (EPGs). In addition, I stressed the significance of the way in which the EPGs were key constituent parts within wider ideologically grounded 'party families' i.e., 'an institutional site that brings together political figures belonging to the same ideological camp from across the EU's political system – the European Council, European Commission and European Parliament and the extra-parliamentary Europarties.' (See 「第3章 第8節 欧州議会の院内会派」辰巳浅嗣編著『EU—欧州統合の現在』第4版 創元社, 2020, pp.134-143).

(3a) Eurosceptic mainstreaming and political realignment on the right? Over the last 20-years, the mainstreaming and resilience of radical-right parties has been particularly visible. As some parties have sought to detoxify their brand, previously promised referendums on EU membership or membership of the Euro, inspired by Brexit, have been jettisoned. The goal of a ‘Europe of Nation States’, though, remains an ideational priority. Today, the conservative/radical right and radical right/far-right space at the EU-level has now consolidated via two European Parliamentary Groups (EPGs): the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and Identity & Democracy (I&D). Projections for 2024, presently, point to a significant increase in support for the ECR. If that proves to be the case, the possibility of closer co-operation between the ECR and EPP looks increasingly likely (with the additional possibility of some I&D members moving to the ECR). Direct I&D and EPP contact at the parliamentary level should be ruled out. Such a scenario appears even more probable now that the ‘grand coalition’ – the decades long robust working relationship between the centre-right EPP, and the centre-left Socialists and Democrats (S&D) – looks to be in jeopardy. S&D Group leader Iratxe García Pérez argued that the EPP was ‘...moving in a dangerous direction: towards... political forces who are not in favour of European integration’ (See ‘EU socialist chief: Cooperation with the EPP no longer possible’, *Euractiv*, 8 May 2023).

The central figure in this *potential realignment* is EPP Parliamentary Group leader and EPP Party leader Manfred Weber. He was recently quoted as saying ‘The Italian model is particularly interesting for the EPP [...] I think we can learn a lot from your experience, given the upcoming European elections’ (Ibid.). The ‘Italian model’ has brought together a coalition of parties that align with the EPP, ECR and I&D. Will bringing such forces closer to the orbit of the EPP negatively impact on the gravitational trajectory of the EPP? Or will it change those seeking closer relations with the EPP? Given the emphasis placed on a ‘Europe of Nation States’ by the ECR and I&D it seems pertinent to ask whether these overtures from Manfred Weber amount to a Faustian bargain, or is simply good politics?’

(4) In our study of Brexit, Masayuki Rikihisa and myself described the way in which Brexit – as an event (the referendum) and a process (actualizing the result i.e., turning it into a political reality) – came about and unfolded between 2016-2020. We also examined the potential impact and consequences of that decision for the UK’s future political and territorial architecture. See 『「ブレグジット」という激震—混迷するイギリス政治』ミネルヴァ書房, 2月2021年. [The issue of territorial politics became the bridge to my present *Kakenbi* project on the possibilities of a united Ireland - Project number 21K01324]. Part of this study, therefore, demonstrated how Eurosceptic forces could successfully deploy an anti-EU vision of the future to overcome the sorts of ‘entrenched interests’ and ‘institutional obstacles’ spoken about by Schmidt and Radaelli (above). Despite the failure to kickstart a cascading effect in the immediate aftermath of Brexit, Eurosceptics continue to press for their medium and long-term belief in the ideational goal of a ‘Europe of Nation States’ (See Allister Heath, ‘The Eurosceptic mission will not be over until the EU withers away’, *Daily Telegraph*, 29 January 2020).

(5) Concluding remarks – A crisis for whom? An opportunity for whom?

With a year to go until the 2024 European elections, measures that could help to build the above-mentioned reservoir of popular legitimacy remain in short supply. Weak Europarties, untried (transnational lists) and underdeveloped (*spitzenkandidaten*) transnational initiatives all remain casualties of ‘indifference’. A year ago, Andrew Duff characterized the political system of the EU as one where ‘...the muddle persists, and governance... remains in flux’ (See *Constitutional Change in the European Union: Towards a Federal Europe*, 2022, Palgrave Macmillan, p.6.) In terms of the near future, that does not appear to be a stable and sustainable position from which to defend the European integration process. Let me finish with a few forward-thinking speculative thoughts/questions:

(a) If the politicization of the EU has now become an embedded feature of the national and European political landscape does that mean that the struggle between advocates of ‘political integration/ever closer union’ and advocates of a ‘Europe of Nation States’ can only intensify? Given the growing presence of Eurosceptic parties within governing coalitions (most recently Finland and possibly Spain next) the answer would appear to be ‘yes’.

(b) If the effect of ‘indifference’ is indeed corrosive, how resilient are the developments and initiatives that already exist? In what ways will ‘indifference’ impact on future initiatives aimed at enhancing democracy at the EU-level?

(c) How significant is the ‘Italian model’ for the future co-operation of political forces on the right side of the political spectrum across the member states and at the EU level? Could a realignment (either formally or informally) become part of the European Parliament’s operating procedures post-2024? If it does, what impact is it likely to have on the integration process?

5. 主な発表論文等

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3. 雑誌名 Asia-Pacific Journal of EU Studies	6. 最初と最後の頁 1-24
掲載論文のDOI（デジタルオブジェクト識別子） なし	査読の有無 有
オープンアクセス オープンアクセスではない、又はオープンアクセスが困難	国際共著 該当する

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〔産業財産権〕

〔その他〕

<p>Transnational Political Parties  <a href="http://academicstudy.jugem.jp/">http://academicstudy.jugem.jp/</a>          This blog stopped in May 2021</p>
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6. 研究組織		
氏名 (ローマ字氏名) (研究者番号)	所属研究機関・部局・職 (機関番号)	備考

7. 科研費を使用して開催した国際研究集会

〔国際研究集会〕 計0件

8. 本研究に関連して実施した国際共同研究の実施状況

共同研究相手国	相手方研究機関
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