

令和 6 年 6 月 13 日現在

機関番号：32615
研究種目：基盤研究(C)（一般）
研究期間：2019～2023
課題番号：19K00019
研究課題名（和文）Kant: The Critique of Pure Rousseau

研究課題名（英文）Kant: The Critique of Pure Rousseau

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交付決定額（研究期間全体）：（直接経費） 3,300,000円

研究成果の概要（和文）：この研究プロジェクトは、ルソーがカントの『純粋理性批判』に与えた影響について、『スキャンダルの狭間で カント形而上学への挑戦；「純粋理性批判」とルソーの影響』と題された合計1冊の単行本を生み出した。また、2本の査読付き論文、2本の招待論文、2本の書籍の章を執筆した。7月にはもう2つの本の章が出版される予定である。また、国内外でいくつかのプレゼンテーションを行った。

研究成果の学術的意義や社会的意義

This research project resulted in a number of research presentations, including two invited talks, three peer-reviewed articles, five book chapters and a book-length scholarly manuscript in Japanese, titled, 『スキャンダルの狭間で カント形而上学への挑戦；「純粋理性批判」とルソーの影響』、and published by 知泉書館、in 2024.

研究成果の概要（英文）：This research project produced a total of one book-length monograph on the influence of Rousseau on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. It produced two peer-reviewed articles, and two invited articles, two book chapters. With another two book chapters to be published in July. I also gave several presentations both in Japan and abroad.

研究分野：Philosophy

キーワード：Kant Rousseau Metaphysics

1. 研究開始当初の背景

Research on the relationship between Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant has an illustrious history. The names of Ernst Cassirer, Klaus Reich, Josef Schmucker, Dieter Henrich, George Armstrong Kelly, Richard Velkley, Susan Meld Shell, and John H. Zammito, as well as Megumi Sakabe in Japan, are familiar to anyone who has engaged with this question.

In spite of this kind of quality work, the most recent of these authors, Velkley and Shell, lament the present situation: “Kant’s debt to Rousseau is usually thought to focus on the formulation of the *volunté générale* in the *Social Contract* as a principle source of Kant’s idea of autonomy as self-legislation under the imperative of practical reason” (Meld and Velkley, 2012, p. 196). A lament because this focus misses “the crucial dimension of Kant’s encounter with questions about nature, reason, desire, freedom, and history” when he read Rousseau. The excellent research of the fine scholars listed above has not borne the fruit one would hope. The authors go on to point out that, while it is true that Kant did not find a theory of “pure reason” in Rousseau, his reactions as recorded in the *Remarks* evince a remarkably profound experience. Shell and Velkley pose the important question: “if Rousseau offers no theory of pure or noumenal willing, what does he adduce that is so provocative for Kant?” (Velkley and Shell, 2017, 198). Their answer is that first of all “Rousseau makes Kant aware of an unprecedented crisis in the intellectual and moral life of modern Europe” (Velkley and Shell, 2017, 198). The crisis is a result of the development of human faculties. “As a result [of this development], human life is burdened by luxury, vanity, and factitious desires” (Velkley and Shell, 2017, 198). From this Kant sees that “in the social condition so many unnatural desires come forward, and thereby the provocation to virtue and the sciences arises” (AA 20:11; quoted by Velkley and Shell, 2017, 199). Shell and Velkley draw our attention to the fact that Kant grasps Rousseau’s law that society makes virtue both more necessary and more impossible: “Virtue become ever more necessary and also impossible in our present regime” are Kant’s words but the thought is pure Rousseau (20:98.9-10). As the quote suggests, the situation is not static, rather Kant sees it as the spreading of “corruption” (AA 20:11; quoted 199).

Given this kind of influence of Rousseau on Kant, the question that begs to be asked is: Why is Rousseau’s name never mentioned in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and only mentioned once in all of the three *Critiques*?

2. 研究の目的

Our aim in analyzing the relationship between Rousseau and Kant is primarily to shed light on Kant’s appropriation and transformation of Rousseau, but secondarily we hope in this light to grasp anew Rousseau’s original accomplishment. Reading both Rousseau and Kant from the perspective of their relationship brings to light that which we might otherwise be blind to, and, just as importantly, makes us aware of our blindness. By looking not only at what Kant appropriated from Rousseau but also how these appropriations were both transformed and transforming, we gain a deepened understanding of Kant’s critical project. The measure of the worth of investigating sources and influences is the degree of clarity they afford when we read Kant’s texts.

How does one take the measure of the influence of one genius upon another? As I have already mentioned, we have Kant’s own testimony to Rousseau’s influence in the *Remarks*. On the other hand, Kant is very reticent in naming Rousseau as a source in his published writings. The name Rousseau does not appear in the first *Critique* at all. On the surface, at least, the topics and themes of the *Critique of Pure Reason* do not seem to resonate with “Rousseauian” themes. There is no state of nature, no noble savage, no social contract, and not much pedagogy. So we have to go beneath the surface and discover what “gift of a rule” Kant got from Rousseau. In a preliminary and provisional fashion I would articulate the rule Kant derived from Rousseau as: the human condition is such that self-knowledge is both necessary and

impossible. One has to philosophize from that condition in such a way as to invite others to recognize that condition and to also philosophize from it.

Kant “followed” but never surpassed the genius Rousseau. According to Kant, ‘the rule [of the genius] must be abstracted from the deed, i.e. from the product, against which others may test their own talent, letting it serve them as a model not for **copying** [*Nachmachung*] but for **imitation** [*Nachahmung*]. How this is possible is difficult to explain’ (AA 5: 310; 2000: 188). This difficult-to-explain possibility is precisely what I hope to explain in the concrete case of Rousseau and Kant. Kant provides an example of the difficulty of this task in the passage just quoted. Is there a difference between “copying” and “imitation,” and, if so, in what does it consist? Sanford Budick in his excellent study *Kant and Milton* makes the true but somewhat unhelpful suggestion that translating *Nachfolge* as succession better suggests “the independence achieved in this exceeding of imitation by a special kind of imitation” (Budick, 2010:xii). I call it unhelpful but in fact it may be the only way we can express this strange activity that is not simply aping someone but is also not original creation. We could perhaps appeal to the distinction between imitation (copying) and emulation (a special kind of imitation). (Rocha, 2015)

3 . 研究の方法

Throughout my research project I have let Kant teach me how to read Rousseau. In my writings I have spelled out the way in which Rousseau’s standard of the natural man made Kant aware of his own prejudice against the common person and helped him to overcome it, so that Kant’s intellectual enterprise was re-oriented to serve the good of humankind. This involved Kant in imitating or following Rousseau in both trying to understand and articulate the exact nature of the problem which is the source of our unhappiness and to propose a solution to that problem. I also used “pre-critical writings, such as *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* to show the way that Kant articulated this understanding. One of the important points that we take away from this work is that Kant follows Rousseau in proposing a way to true metaphysics that must pass the rejection of false metaphysics. False metaphysics is not something that one can avoid; one cannot get directly to true metaphysics. In this way metaphysics is always double and arises out of conflict. *Dreams* was a failure in that it did not succeed in transforming its readers, only in confusing them. Kant then took the much longer road of the critical project.

Turning to our research on the *First Critique*, I analyzed the “Prefaces” to both the first and the second editions to show how much the questions from *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* still haunt its opening pages. After seeing how much Rousseau is in the background of the writing of the first *Critique*, I also looked carefully at the introductory section to the Transcendental Dialectic. There Kant, who inherited the notion of illusion and of a split between appearances and reality at least in part from Rousseau, introduces the distinction between “transcendental” and “transcendent,” the lack of congruence between ideas and any empirical object, as well as the *Ansehen* or appearance of the principles of reason, to deal with the problems raised by this. But Rousseau’s influence is not limited to establishing the questions or the problems that Kant will address. He is also provides some crucial elements in Kant’s attempt to solve the problems.

Primary among these is Rousseau’s notion of “idea,” which I spent much time and effort investigating. Readers of Kant are familiar with Kant’s introduction of the ideas via Plato’s conception of the same and his oft-quoted claim that “when we compare the thoughts that an author expresses about a subject, in ordinary speech as well as in writings, it is not at all unusual to find that we understand him even better than he understood himself” (B 370). The Rousseauian background has been known since at least the early part of the 1960’s but less appreciated. The ideas of reason are projections of a maximum that can never be realized in experience. They serve a valuable role in practical reason, and can be valuable in speculative reason when used in regulative function. But these same valuable and in themselves good ideas wreak havoc when used in a constitutive manner and they always seem to end up being used in that way. Ideas contain conflict in two senses of the word ‘contain.’ They have the conflict within them and they keep the conflict in check. This is a phenomenon that Kant found in Rousseau’s *Emile*.

Rousseau's influence on Kant is also apparent in Kant's conception of the "I." I present historical evidence that Kant was looking to Rousseau when he was thinking through his conception of the "I" and that he found valuable help in the "Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar." I then show that the dynamic within the ideas that moves from the "I" through the world to God is based on the same "Profession of Faith." While there is a movement from one idea to the other, I also emphasize how each of these ideas reveals our dependence on and our conflict with others. We find all of these themes taken up and dealt with again the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic.

One aspect of my method is to look at the oft-neglected parts of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, especially the second part, the Doctrine of Method. I demonstrate again here Rousseau's massive presence in the text. Neither Rousseau, nor Kant at this point, have a stable system. Both need a system of discipline to keep the structure intact. But Kant shows his movement beyond Rousseau in the self-implicating nature of his understanding of the human condition.

The emphasis on the Doctrine of Method allows me to show how deeply Rousseau's *Emile* has influenced Kant's understanding of the human condition. For Rousseau the place of the human being is the place of the victim and I am able to show that Kant also embraces this. The victim is that which cannot be killed because it is sacred and is sacred because it is that which is killed. The dual forces that run so deep in our societies and in our hearts find their fundamental expression in religious language and neither Rousseau nor Kant shy away from this language when it is necessary. But this extreme situation has a paradoxical effect: when one's situation is impossible and necessary, then there is no way out, there is no radical solution. All that is left to one is to balance the forces and to work to maintain the balance so that one does not lose one's place. Kant went as far as he could in 1781 to explain what humans could know. He ended the work by writing about the kind of discipline necessary to keep our knowing from undermining itself by leading to more rather than less conflict. The rewriting that took place for the second edition showed that Kant was not satisfied with a work that promised "full satisfaction" (B 884). The same force that drove him to the critique of pure reason, the "ostensible contradiction of reason with itself" will also drive him more and more deeply into the critical project ((Kant and Zweig, 1999:552).

4 . 研究成果

This research projected resulted in a number of research presentations, including two invited talks, three peer-reviewed articles, five book chapters and a book-length scholarly manuscript in Japanese, titled, 『スキャンダルの狭間で カント形而上学への挑戦 ; 「純粹理性批判」とルソーの影響』, and published by 知泉書館、in 2024 . I believe that my research is making Kant scholars look again at Rousseau's influence on Kant's *Critiques* and not just on his philosophy of history or his philosophical anthropology. It shifts our understanding of Kant from being primarily concerned with epistemology to placing that concern within its wider philosophical context. I have received two unsolicited letters from Japanese scholars of Kant, who wrote that they have reached a much deeper understanding of Rousseau's influence on Kant and therefore a deeper understanding of Kant's thought through my research.

5. 主な発表論文等

〔雑誌論文〕 計2件（うち査読付論文 2件/うち国際共著 2件/うちオープンアクセス 0件）

1. 著者名 Alberg Jeremiah	4. 巻 28
2. 論文標題 Did Rousseau Teach Kant Discipline?	5. 発行年 2022年
3. 雑誌名 Kantian Review	6. 最初と最後の頁 1~19
掲載論文のDOI（デジタルオブジェクト識別子） 10.1017/S1369415422000516	査読の有無 有
オープンアクセス オープンアクセスではない、又はオープンアクセスが困難	国際共著 該当する

1. 著者名 Jeremiah Alberg	4. 巻 3(1)
2. 論文標題 What the Text Omits: Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and Violence and the Sacred	5. 発行年 2022年
3. 雑誌名 Giornale di filosofia	6. 最初と最後の頁 61-74
掲載論文のDOI（デジタルオブジェクト識別子） 10.7413/1827-5834027	査読の有無 有
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〔学会発表〕 計7件（うち招待講演 2件/うち国際学会 5件）

1. 発表者名 Jeremiah Alberg
2. 発表標題 Remapping Kant's Relation to Christianity
3. 学会等名 Emerging Crisis: New Humanities and Mimetic Theory（国際学会）
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3. 学会等名 近代英国哲学とキリスト教神学研究会
4. 発表年 2021年

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3. 学会等名 International Society for Scottish Philosophy (国際学会)
4. 発表年 2022年

1. 発表者名 Jeremiah Alberg
2. 発表標題 Rousseau's Presence in the Groundwork: Beyond the Categorical Imperative
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4. 発表年 2019年

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2. 発表標題 Transcendent Principles and the Violent Sacred
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1. 著者名 Jeremiah Alberg, Eve Grace, Christopher Kelly	4. 発行年 2019年
2. 出版社 Routledge	5. 総ページ数 13
3. 書名 The Rousseauian Mind	

〔産業財産権〕

〔その他〕

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6. 研究組織

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7. 科研費を使用して開催した国際研究集会

〔国際研究集会〕 計0件

8. 本研究に関連して実施した国際共同研究の実施状況

共同研究相手国	相手方研究機関