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研究課題名（和文）「中国の脅威」と「台湾人」の誕生：冷戦後の台湾の安全保障政策に関する一考察

研究課題名（英文）The “China Threat” and the Birth of the “Taiwanese”：A Reflection on Taiwan’s Post-Cold War Security Policy

研究代表者

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研究成果の概要（和文）：本研究は、台湾海峡における緊張の高まりと、台湾住民の台湾人というアイデンティティの間のポジティブな相関関係に関する伝統的な知恵というものを課題として取り上げた。これは、中国の勃興をどう理解するかに関する論議や脅威論に関する研究に新たな光を当てるものである。本研究は、『Taiwan’s restrictions on cross-Strait trade and investment until 2008』で一つの章として出版するに至った。さらに中国融和路線の国民党が2008年5月に政権に返り咲いた後の台湾の安全保障政策の変化と連続性をたどった、これから出版される予定の本の一つの章として出版予定である。

研究成果の概要（英文）：This research problematizes the conventional wisdom about the positive correlation between the rise in cross-Taiwan Strait tension and Taiwan residents’ self-identification as Taiwanese, which sheds new light on the study of threat perception as well as the debate on how to understand China’s rise. This project has led to the publication of one book chapter on Taiwan’s restrictions on cross-Strait trade and investment until 2008, in addition to one forthcoming book chapter that traces the change and continuity of Taiwanese security policy after the China-accommodating Kuomintang regained power in May 2008.

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1. 研究開始当初の背景

This research seeks to explore the relationship between Taiwan’s threat perceptions and its national identity construction through an examination of Taipei’s post-Cold War foreign and security policy with respect to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). It is guided by two central questions. First, how is China perceived as a threat

in mainstream Taiwanese security discourse and why? Second, what are the political consequences of adopting the predominant modes of interpreting China as a threat? These questions are important because international perceptions of China as a destabilizing power are typically associated with Taiwan’s claim that China is a threat to the regional stability.

Nevertheless, cross-Strait security issues have been largely considered as offshoots of US-PRC rivalry (Ross 2000; Friedman 2002; Wachman 2007), ignoring the logical sequence that the Taiwan Strait would not have been described as the “most dangerous flashpoint on earth” that could draw two nuclear-armed great powers and even Japan into war without Taipei’s identification of China as the principal threat in the first place (Tucker 2002; Christensen 2002).

Furthermore, the inclination that Taiwanese leaders and people alike are generally alert to any slight indication of hostility from the PRC creates a puzzle for the international relations (IR) scholarship. According to Jervis’s (1976) landmark study of psychological factors affecting foreign policy making, weaker states tend to perceive a given country as less a menace than do stronger ones and to underestimate the chances of harm than be highly sensitive to them. Likewise, in order to discredit the sender’s “reputation for action” (Schelling 1966: 124), mainstream deterrence theory holds that it makes good strategic sense for the weaker target state to de-emphasize the sender’s threat image rather than play it up. From an alliance politics perspective (Snyder 1997), an overly sensitive threat perception on the part of Taipei might increase Washington’s anxiety that a closer US-Taiwan security cooperation could drag it into an unwanted conflict with China.

Yet few intellectual inquiries have been made to investigate how China’s threat images come into being in Taiwan, their underlying assumptions, and practical effects (Cole 2006; Chase 2008; Roy 2009). My research attempts to fill this void in the academic literature about Taiwan’s security policy, which has important implications for the study of threat perception in general and the debates on how to understand China’s rise in particular.

2. 研究の目的

My previous research noted that the literature on the change of national identity in Taiwan provides a potentially plausible explanation about Taiwanese’s perceptual vigilance. It is widely held by

those who support, observe, or even oppose Taiwan independence that the cause for rising Taiwanese national consciousness is a product of the Beijing-imposed international isolation and the military threat from across the Strait. The “China threat” against Taiwan, or at least Taiwanese perceptions of it, has functioned as a “pushing force,” which, together with the “pulling force” (Taiwan’s democratization), has been playing the most crucial role in contributing to the rise of Taiwanese nationalism since the end of the Cold War (Lin 2002).

Against this conventional wisdom, Shih (2007) has challenged the “pulling force” argument by demonstrating that the emergence of un-Chinese consciousness occurred before democratization and could not have become possible without Taiwan being discursively treated as an independent reference point in the first place. This project seeks to perform another task that calls into question the taken-for-granted reaction-against-China threat argument. Rather than see China as a threat to the emerging Taiwanese state’s identity or existence, it argues that the former can be understood as the latter’s condition of possibility; to be precise, the need for an external threat affects the ways in which China is viewed as a menace in the eyes of the Taiwanese (Oren 2003).

Through an examination of the ways in which China is portrayed as an economic, political, and military threat in Taiwanese security discourse as well as their consequences, my alternative account suggests that, rather than simply working as a “pushing force” that gives rise to the notion of “Taiwanese” as a national identity, China’s threat images in Taiwan tell us more about Taiwan residents’ difficulty in constructing such an identity.

In other words, the familiar “China threat-as-pushing force” explanation about the surge of Taiwanese nationalism mistakes symptoms for causes. By this I mean that the predominant perceptions of the “China threat” in Taiwanese security discourse has been a symptom of the difficulties “Taiwanese” have had in constructing a sense of national identity rather than being a fundamental cause of

the rise of Taiwanese national consciousness. This is so because the levels of threat Taipei claims to perceive from China do not correspond well with those of the countermeasures it has undertaken, which, in turn, casts doubt on the appropriateness of the conventional formulation that treats foreign policy as an intentional act adopted by the pre-given state to cope with the dangers and uncertainties stemming from its security environment. Taipei's post-Cold War foreign and security policy can thus be interpreted as an exercise in constituting Taiwanese identity through its repeated claims of China threats. It reveals a lot about the island's insecurity in terms of its national identity's lack of pre-discursive foundations as well as its inability to cultivate an identity which does not rely on demonizing Others and other ethically problematic strategies.

3. 研究の方法

The analytical framework adopted in this research is based on an alternative formulation of foreign policy that does not conceive it simply as the policies of states oriented toward the external world but rather a political practice that draws boundaries between states (Campbell 1998). Obviously, this is not a traditional definition one often encounters in the study of foreign policy, which treats it as the "authoritative actions which governments take or are committed to take in order either to preserve the desirable aspects of the international environment or to alter its undesirable aspects" (Rosenau 1974: 6).

This is not to argue that the above alternative conception of foreign policy is "better" than the conventional one or to draw a clear-cut, sharp distinction between them. Nevertheless, when accepted too readily, the latter is less likely to lead one to question the relationship between Taiwan's threat perception and its national identity construction. As Campbell indicates, it is important to ask "how foreign policy comes to be understood as the bridge between sovereign states existing in an anarchic world, a bridge that is constructed between two prior, securely grounded, and nominally independent realms" (1998: 40). Seen in

this light, it is helpful not to consider Taiwanese foreign policy solely as the external orientation of a pre-given and settled national identity. In so doing, the research hopes to make a knowledge-claim which is self-reflective in nature, which is aware of its condition of possibility.

In order to adequately understand Taiwanese threat perception regarding China, this study looks at various first-hand and second-hand materials pertaining to Taiwan's security policy that are available in the public domain, such as policy statements, official speeches and statistics, newspaper articles and think tank studies by using the technique of discourse analysis. I will also conduct semi-structured interviews with former and current officials of Taiwan's national security establishment and well-connected scholars in Taipei. The version of discourse analysis adopted here is one that can be applied both naturally occurring and contrived forms of talk and to texts, which emphasizes "the way versions of world, of society, events and inner psychological worlds are produced in discourse" (Bryman 2004: 370). From this perspective, discourse is not simply a "neutral" device for imparting meaning; rather, discourse is concerned with the strategies people employ consciously or not in trying to create different kinds of effect. It is concerned with what the discourse is doing, and how the discourse is constructed to make that happen.

In my case studies on Taiwan's economic policy toward the PRC, its quest for international recognition and US arms sales debates, therefore, I do not merely describe how China comes to be seen as the most serious threat to Taiwan's economic, political, and military security. I put no less emphasis in examining the underlying assumptions and internal consistency of those prevailing perceptions in a manner congenial to IR theory-minded readers. The reason of doing so is not just because theoretically informed cases can help build solid knowledge about foreign policy (Smith et al. 2008); indeed, engaging IR theory (notably some versions of realism) is helpful for understanding how the mainstream security discourse has been constructed in particular ways that work

to make the image of a different, antagonistic China in Taiwan possible.

4 . 研究成果

The end result of this project has led to the publication of one book chapter (which includes a case study on Taiwan's restrictions on cross-Taiwan Strait trade and investment until 2008) as well as one forthcoming book chapter tracing the change and continuity of Taiwanese security policy after the China-accommodating Kuomintang, (KMT) regained power in May 2008. Together with two journal articles I published earlier with the *Issues & Studies* (2009) and *Journal of Chinese Political Science* (2010), the project has prepared the ground for the publication of one academic book. I have informally discussed my book proposal with an Asian security series editor of a university publisher based in the USA and I intend to submit my completed book manuscript to that publisher within 2 years.

The scholarly and policy significance of this JSPS-funded project is four-fold. To begin with, it is the first comprehensive and critical investigation on Taiwanese perceptions of the China threat, which fills a crucial void in the existing literature on East Asian security. The research has addressed a largely unnoticed puzzle as to why Taiwanese tend to be excessively vigilant about any indication of China's enmity.

Second, while the need to take into account the intrinsic linkage between security and subjectivity in the study of foreign policy has been pointed out by critical scholarship, this research is novel in showing that the current understanding about the relationship between the perceived China threat to Taiwan and the rise of Taiwanese national consciousness can be the other way round.

Third, this analysis has relevance for making sense of negative international perceptions of contemporary China. If China's threat image has been an integral element in the discursive constitution of Taiwanese national identity, the Taiwanese case suggests that the persistence of the "China threat theory" in other parts of the world (including Japan) could also be a product of identity politics rather than mere perceptual

errors or malign foreign designs. Finally, it adds to an exercise in reflexivity that acknowledges that mainstream IR theories in general and realism in particular have never been simply explaining Taiwan's strategic behavior under the shadow of China but rather themselves an intimate part of the political problems in Taiwan. By examining the ways in which specific concepts and theories have been re-appropriated in Taiwanese security discourse for purposes unfamiliar to Western IR, this study has contributed to the development of "non-Western" IR studies in Asia which takes the agency of local voices and practices more seriously.

5 . 主な発表論文等

(研究代表者、研究分担者及び連携研究者には下線)

[学会発表](計3件)

Ching-Chang Chen, "Explaining the Absence of Hedging in Taiwan's Security Policy under the Ma Ying-Jeou Administration", Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, 2012/4/2, San Diego, USA

Ching-Chang Chen, "The Relaxation of Japan's Three Principles on Arms Exports and Its Implications for US Arms Sales to Taiwan", International Conference on "US Arms Sales to Taiwan: A Policy at a Crossroads", 2012/8/3, Taipei, Taiwan

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[図書](計2件)

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〔その他〕

ホームページ等

Media appearance related to my research on Taiwan and its external relations

www.atimes.com/atimes/China/NH16Ad01.html

www.atimes.com/atimes/China/NH24Ad02.html

www.atimes.com/atimes/China/NI27Ad01.html

http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=5075&Itemid=386

<http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12595/facing-an-aggressive-china-japans-abe-may-turn-to-taiwan>

6. 研究組織

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