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研究課題名（和文）A Post-Socialist State and Poverty in Central Asia: Implications for the Emerging Theory of Human Security

研究課題名（英文）A Post-Socialist State and Poverty in Central Asia: Implications for the Emerging Theory of Human Security

研究代表者

Ｉｓｍａｉｌｏｖ　Ｍｕｒｏｄ（ISMAILOV, Murod）

筑波大学・人文社会系・助教

研究者番号：１０７０１７８２

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研究成果の概要（和文）：本研究の目的は社会主義後の中央ユーラシア諸国（アルメニア、アゼルバイジャン、グルジア、カザフ、キルギス、タジク、トルクメンとウズベキスタン）における貧困問題を引き起こす要因を特定することにあります。本研究は事例研究と比較研究の方法を組み合わせます。
本研究の成果として社会主義後の国家における転換過程は理論上のような単純なものではないことを明らかにしています。これらの国々における経済発展と貧困撲滅は必ずしも関連性があると言えないというのが本研究が強調することです。同時にこれらの政府の目的として二つのことが挙げられており、その一つは政治的なエリートの利益を確保することです。

研究成果の概要（英文）：Initially the research was designed to focus on 2 countries of Central Asia (Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan) to study the role of post-Socialist state in tackling poverty. After rounds of interviews, the geography of study was expanded to include 8 countries of Central Eurasia. With this framework, the study sought to identify the institutional arrangements responsible for the persistence of poverty. The study employed QCA as methodology. The key research question is what inst.conditions play a “better” role in the persistence of poverty. The analysis of country cases undergoing a transition from socialism to market economy showed that this process is not straightforward. It concludes that poverty eradication takes a non-linear path because the regional countries experiencing a transformation from socialist to market system sought to promote the unique sets of political and economic institutions to either advance the vested interests of political elites or respond to domestic pressures.

研究分野：政治学

キーワード：貧困　中央アジア　中央ユーラシア　QCA　ポスト社会主義国　Institutions

## １．研究開始当初の背景 (Background of the Research)

(1) A great number of scholars these days admits that 'institutional factors' play an important role in political and economic organisation of local, national, regional and international processes. The study of institutions or institutionalism which closely examines these factors is defined as a study of how "the forms, outcomes, and dynamics of economic organisation (firms, networks, markets) are influenced and shaped by other social institutions (e.g. training systems, legal systems, political systems, educational systems, etc.)" and with what consequences for economic growth, innovation, employment, and inequality".

(2) If one accepts "institutions" as important structural frames, organisational solutions, and formal systems (Djelic, 2011), then it is appropriate to examine the impact of various institutional arrangements on certain conditions of social life. To be specific, this study focused on the effects of and relationship between political and economic institutions and poverty, especially in the post-socialist states of Central Eurasia most of which are still undergoing transition from one institutional framework to another. We chose the case of poverty in post-socialist states because it is arguably among the most pressing and complex social phenomena these countries faced as they transitioned from socialist to market systems after becoming sovereign states in early 1990s.

## ２．研究の目的 (Purpose of the Research)

(1) As such, the objective of this research is twofold: one, the paper seeks to identify both political and economic institutions affecting the persistence of poverty in the states of Central Eurasia.

(2) Secondly, the paper develops a model to examine political and economic sets of institutional arrangements, and thus independently underlines the primary structural conditions affecting the poverty in countries of the region.

## ３．研究の方法 (Methodology)

(1) This study employs multiple case studies as a primary research strategy via the application of a configurational comparative method or the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). According to Ragin (1987) the strategy helps to accumulate an in-depth insight into different cases and to capture their complexity, while in the meantime seeking to achieve some degree of generalisation. The strategy is effective given that many relevant objects of research are associated with numbers, such as states, regional entities, political and economic crises, conflicts, and so on. Thus, the use of this research strategy "allows systematic cross-case comparisons, while at the same time gives justice to within-case complexity, particularly in small- and intermediate-N research designs" (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009: xviii).

(2) As for the first step, we have conducted extensive desk research, e-mail and telephone interviews, spatially and periodically limited on-site survey interviews and other fieldwork between 2013-2015 in order to accumulate adequate substantive knowledge about each country case and theoretical knowledge about the most relevant (institutional conditions and the outcome, i.e. poverty) included in the analysis.

In this study we focus only on a group of non-Russian speaking former Soviet states of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) and South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia), which are commonly known as Central Eurasia (CER). The countries which constitute this sub-region share some similarities as well differences in the way how the patterns of their social and economic development had evolved in the past two decades, albeit under peculiar domestic political environments.

Among the large variety of conditions favouring the persistence of Poverty (Dependent Variable/Outcome) in post-Socialist states of CER, we have selected the ones analysed by Acemoglu and Robinson in their research project titled "Why Nations Fail?". Certainly, one could examine additional institutional arrangements (such as intermediate organisations, macroeconomic structure), but for purposes of theoretical simplification, selecting 8 institutional arrangements or Independent Variables/Conditions will suffice (including, Accountability in Governance, Political System, Political Clientalism, Political Centralisation & Conflict Intensity, Human development, Labour Market, Level playing field, State Capture).

## ４．研究成果 (Result of the research)

**(1) Analysis:** The first "truth table" (Table 1) shows only the configurations corresponding to the political conditions observed in all 8 cases. It already allows to partially synthesize the evidence, by transforming the 8 cases into 4 configurations. We find out the following:

- There are no configurations with [1] outcome yet.
- There are 3 distinct configurations with a [0] outcome, corresponding respectively to Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan.

There is also 1 *contradictory* configuration corresponding to 5 cases out of 8. In other words, these five cases (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) seem to resemble each

other in terms of the political conditions present within each case, and yet they produce a different outcome ("Armenia + Uzbekistan = relatively poor" and "Azerbaijan + Kazakhstan + Turkmenistan = less poor"). The data in this "truth table" can also be visualised through a Venn diagram which depicts 4 conditions as follows (Figure 1):

| Country ID | ACGOV | POLSYST | POLCLIENT | POLCENTR | OUTCOME |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ARM, AZE, KAZ, TUK, UZB | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | C |
| GEO | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| KYR | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TAJ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Table 1: "Truth table" (political conditions)




Figure 1: Venn Diagram Corresponding to Table 1

This Venn diagram has 16 basic zones (configurations) – which is $2^4$ zones. In this particular case (Figure 1), we can observe 3 types of configurations:

- Three configurations with [0] outcome, covering respectively the cases of Tajikistan, Georgia and Kyrgyz Republic.
- One contradictory configuration, covering 5 cases.
- And, many non-observed, "logical remainder" configurations (12 altogether).

The key problem here is that we have one substantial contradictory configuration. Although, the csQCA technique suggests that we first resolve this contradiction before proceeding further, we admit that almost all QCA strategies or their combinations cannot resolve this particular contradiction since the conditions and the outcomes present in these 5 country-cases are robust and cannot be altered (see: Rihoux & Ragin, 2009: 48-50). This is particularly true, considering that the csQCA is a case-oriented method in which each case matters. We can now only assume that the csQCA has already helped reveal the flaws in applicability of the theory in CER cases.

Compared to the Truth table 1 of political conditions for the persistence of poverty, the examination of economic conditions, as seen in Table 2, proves to contain no contradictory configurations. This can be visualised as a Venn diagram, as seen in Figure 2.

| Country ID | HUMDEV | LABMARK | LEVPLAYF | STACAPT | OUTCOME |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ARM, KYR | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| AZE | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| GEO | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| KAZ | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| TAJ, UZB | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TUK | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |

Table 2: "Truth table" (economic conditions)




Figure 2: Venn Diagram Corresponding to Table 2

Given that the examination of *political and economic conditions* independent from one another so far has created unresolvable configuration (in the case of political conditions) we realised that it is necessary to merge both dichotomized data tables, which enabled the software to produce an expanded truth-table. The merging of both dichotomised data-sets can be justified on theoretical grounds too: Acemoglu and Robinson's theory suggests that it is a complex relationship between inclusive political and inclusive economic "institutional frameworks" that enables the states to effectively fight poverty.We thus obtain an expanded "truth table" (Table 3). As seen here, this new "truth table" enabled us to resolve our key contradiction. Consider, for example, the five cases of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan which formed a contradictory configuration when we examined only 4 political conditions. By adding the [HUMDEV] or [LABMARK] or [LEVPLAYF] we can now differentiate Armenia which has a [0] value on [LABMARK] from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, which have a [1] value on [LABMARK].

| Country ID | ACGOV | POLSYST | POLCLIENT | POLCENTR | HUMDEV | LABMARK | LEVPLAYF | STACAPT | OUTCOME |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ARM | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| AZE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| GEO | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| KAZ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| KYR | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| TAJ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TUK | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| UZB | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Table 3: “Truth table” (all conditions combined)

Thus, this revised contradiction-free truth table allows us to move to the most important stage in QCA analysis – *the Boolean minimization*.

The Tosmana software conducts the Boolean minimization through binary algorithms by differentiating [1] configurations from the [0] configurations. Therefore, we shall apply the minimization procedure at least two times in order to produce [1] and [0] configurations respectively.

*Minimization of the [1] Configurations (without logical remainders)*

After conducting the minimization of the [1] configurations without considering non-observed cases (logical remainders), we come up with the following minimal formula:

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| acgov * polsyst * polclient * POLCENTR * HUMDEV * LABMARK * STACAPT | + | acgov * polsyst * polclient * POLCENTR * humdev * LABMARK * levplayf * stacapt | → | less poor |
| (AZE+KAZ) | + | (TUK) | | |

Following the Boolean notation, we can read it as follows: “The [1] outcome (lower poverty rates) is observed:

- In countries that combine low “accountability in governance [acgov] *AND* low “political system” [polsyst] *AND* high “political clientalism” [polclient] *AND* high “political centralization” [POLCENTR] *AND* higher “human development” [HUMDEV] *AND* higher “labour market” [LABMARK] and lower levels of “state capture” [STACAPT]

  OR

- In countries that combine low “accountability in governance [acgov] *AND* low “political system” [polsyst] *AND* high “political clientalism” [polclient] *AND* high “political centralization” [POLCENTR] *AND* lower “human development” [humdev] *AND* higher “labour market” [LABMARK] *AND* lower “level playing field” [levplayf] *AND* higher levels of “state capture” [stacapt]

We can see that the two terms of the formula share [POLCENTR*LABMARK] combination of conditions. We make this combination more visible by modifying the minimal formula and as a consequence we come up with a more structured variant of the formula.

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| acgov * polsyst * polclient * POLCENTR * LABMARK * | { | HUMDEV humdev levplayf stacapt STACAPT | → | less poor |

*Minimization of the [0] Configurations (without logical remainders)*

We now conduct the minimization of the [0] configurations without considering non-observed cases (simplifying assumptions), and come up with the following minimal formula:

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| acgov * polsyst * polclient * humdev * labmark * levplayf * stacapt | + | acgov * polsyst * polclient * POLCENTR * humdev * labmark * LEVPLAYF * STACAPT | + | ACGOV * POLSYST * POLCLIENT * polcentr * HUMDEV * labmark * LEVPLAYF * STACAPT | | |
| (TAJ+UZB) | | (ARM) | | (GEO) | | |
| | + | ACGOV * POLSYST * polclient * polcentr * humdev * labmark * LEVPLAYF * STACAPT | → | RELATIVELY POOR | | |
| | | (KYR) | | | | |

Similar to the previous formula, this minimal formula is also important. While reading this formula in the same way as the previous one, we can observe that csQSA provides with four different configurations to the [0] outcome. The first configuration corresponds to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan which share the [acgov * polsyst * polclient * humdev * labmark * levplayf * stacapt] combination, that is the combination [0] values on seven conditions – which may well be consistent with the theory. On the other hand, we can find only one condition [lambark] which is present in all five cases, in other words, the low level or underdeveloped nature of the labour market can be the key feature of countries experiencing higher rates of poverty. The latter, on the other hand, is less relevant to the theory.

(2) **Key Findings:**

① In this study we have generally recognized that the nations cannot effectively increase the living standards of

their populace (i.e. elevate poverty) without first setting up inclusive economic and political institutions. However, the complex country-specific conditions underlying the transformation from socialist to the market system forced the CER countries to adopt unique institutional configurations to either endorse the survival of incumbent political elites and their pursuit to monopolize the economic resources or respond to the growing domestically-driven social demands for government's efficiency, transparency and accountability. These tendencies turn out to be even more complex if one adds such factors as demographic pressures or high reliance on natural resources shaping the structure of respective national economies.

② Our analysis of 8 different country cases in Central Eurasia undergoing a transition from socialism to market relations showed that this process is not as straightforward as the theory suggests. This argument could be succinctly translated into the following proposition. *Poverty eradication in CER countries takes a non-linear trajectory as countries experiencing a transformation from socialist to market system sought to promote and maintain the unique sets of political and economic institutions to either advance the vested interests of political elites or respond to domestic social pressures.*

③ On the other hand, as noted earlier, the theory provides an appropriate analytic framework in order to explain some of the observed tendencies in the CER region. Let us look at the fact that some country cases examined in this study have apparently failed to reduce poverty in the past decade due to the lack of inclusive institutions, yet others showed considerable progress in bringing down the poverty rates even though the overall nature of political and economic institutions remained fairly extractive. This largely conforms with the theory that extractive economic and political institutions are not necessarily immune from economic growth. As noted earlier any extractive political authority seeks as much growth as possible in order to have more to extract. Those extractive institutions that manage to achieve some degree of political centralisation are able to generate a relative amount of growth.

④ These arguments may also yield several important theoretical implications: the individual consideration of both political and economic institutional conditions under a continuously-evolving post-socialist institutional framework reveals that both sets of institutions produce different configuration of outcomes for country cases. This shows the uniqueness of each nation state, importantly the peculiar sets of underlying conditions. We suggest that the theories advancing the purely politico-economic institutional factors behind states' failure to tackle poverty may work in explaining "institutionally well-shaped" countries, rather than the new nation-states that are drifting between the old and emerging institutional frameworks.

⑤ Another significant theoretical implication of this study is that such non-institutional structural factors as "demographic changes/economic pressures" (Poverty = Demographic Pressures + Economic Growth (GNI)) and "availability of natural resources/natural resources-based economy" (somewhat disregarded in the theory as too subjective or country-specific) need to be part of the general analysis.

## ５．主な発表論文等

**（研究代表者、研究分担者及び連携研究者には下線）**

**〔雑誌論文〕（計１件）(Journal articles)**

(1) Ismailov, M. (Conditionally accepted – to be published in 2015). Poverty, Post-Socialist States and Institutions in Central Eurasia: a QCA perspective. *The British Journal of Advanced Science and Technology.* ISSN: 2231-0843. DOI: TBA, **査読あり**

**〔学会発表〕（計６件）(Presentation in conference)**

(1) Ismailov, M. *"A Post-Socialist State and Poverty in Central Asia".* Global Academic Network International Conference, Mount Saint Mary's University, Los Angeles, USA, March 19-22, 2015.

(2) Ismailov, M. *"Poverty in Central Asia: cases of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan".* International research seminar "Poverty, Development and Globalisation In Central Asia And Eastern Europe", University of World Economy and Diplomacy, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, August 25, 2014.

(3) Ismailov, M. *"Human Security: Concept and Approaches"* CADI Special Research Seminar, Central Asian Development Institute, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, February 21, 2014.

(4) Ismailov, M. *"Neighbourhoods and Social Capital in Uzbekistan"*, SPSA Annual Conference, New Orleans, USA, January 11, 2014.

(5) Ismailov, M. *"Poverty in Central Asia"*, Special Research Seminar at the American University in Central Asia, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, December 18, 2013.

## ６．研究組織:

**(1) 研究代表者**:

**イスマイロフ　ムロド**　(ISMAILOV, Murod)
**筑波大学・人文社会系・助教**
**研究番号：**10701782