| 研究課題/領域番号 |
19K01561
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| 研究種目 |
基盤研究(C)
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| 配分区分 | 基金 |
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| 応募区分 | 一般 |
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| 審査区分 |
小区分07010:理論経済学関連
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| 研究機関 | 早稲田大学 |
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研究代表者 |
Kvasov Dmitriy 早稲田大学, 政治経済学術院, 准教授 (90791525)
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| 研究期間 (年度) |
2019-04-01 – 2024-03-31
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| 研究課題ステータス |
交付 (2022年度)
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| 配分額 *注記 |
4,290千円 (直接経費: 3,300千円、間接経費: 990千円)
2021年度: 1,560千円 (直接経費: 1,200千円、間接経費: 360千円)
2020年度: 1,560千円 (直接経費: 1,200千円、間接経費: 360千円)
2019年度: 1,170千円 (直接経費: 900千円、間接経費: 270千円)
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| キーワード | Game theory / Backward induction / Imperfect recall / Nonlinear games / Kuhn theorem / game theory |
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| 研究開始時の研究の概要 |
1. provide new definitions of main equilibrium concepts: subgame perfect, perfect,
sequential equilibrium, and quasi-perfect equilibrium that are suitable for the games without perfect recall;
2. formulate and prove series of theorems that describe properties of the newly define concepts: their existence and relationships among them;
3. investigate the implications of the theoretical findings for decision-making in situations when agents do not have perfect recall: what is the optimal way of making sequential strategic decisions when full information about the past is not available.
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| 研究実績の概要 |
The revised version of the second paper (Reexamination of the equivalence of strategies) was presented at the invited seminars at Cardiff Business School, Maastricht University, University of Lausanne and University of Zurich. It was also accepted for presentation at 18th European Conference on Game Theory (University of Messina).
The revised version are to be soon submitted for review to Games and Economic Behaviour.
The draft of the third paper (Backward Induction in Nonlinear Games, joint with Professor John Hillas, University of Auckland) was completed.
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| 現在までの達成度 (区分) |
現在までの達成度 (区分)
3: やや遅れている
理由
Dmitriy Kvasov is on sabbatical leave at University of Maastricht. Organizational issues due to temporary re-location to Europe slightly delayed the planned work on the project.
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| 今後の研究の推進方策 |
The second paper (Reexamination of the equivalence of strategies) to be prepared for publication (based on the results of peer review).
The third paper (Backward Induction in Nonlinear Games) to be submitted for review at Games and Economic Behaviour.
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