| 研究課題/領域番号 |
20J13138
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| 研究種目 |
特別研究員奨励費
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| 配分区分 | 補助金 |
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| 応募区分 | 国内 |
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| 審査区分 |
小区分07010:理論経済学関連
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| 研究機関 | 京都大学 |
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研究代表者 |
HerreraVelasquez Jose de Jesus 京都大学, 大学院経済学研究科, 特別研究員(DC2)
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| 研究期間 (年度) |
2020-04-24 – 2022-03-31
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| 研究課題ステータス |
完了 (2021年度)
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| 配分額 *注記 |
1,100千円 (直接経費: 1,100千円)
2021年度: 500千円 (直接経費: 500千円)
2020年度: 600千円 (直接経費: 600千円)
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| キーワード | Adverse Selection / Contract Mechanism / Multimarket Competition / Stackelberg Oligopoly / Production Constraint / Conglomerate Mergers / Antitrust / Diversification / Game Theory / Resources |
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| 研究開始時の研究の概要 |
To comprehensively study the economic reasoning behind the conglomerate mergers in a competitive structure from the perspective of the field of industrial organization based on game theory. First, we analyze the conglomerate mergers in the context of agency problems. Second, we study the merger and divesting decisions of the firms.
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| 研究実績の概要 |
The paper "Agency problems in a competitive conglomerate with production constraints" was completed. The study develops an adverse selection model of a competing conglomerate with production constraints. It fully characterize the first and the second-best contracts. When the production constraints make the first best outcome unattainable, the second-best contract is either separating or pooling.
The paper "Conglomerate merger and divestment dynamics" was completed. It employs a discrete-time, infinite horizon theoretical model to analyze the diversifying and divesting behavior of a monopolist. The conglomerate acquires a firm and stays merged in periods where the value of the demand of the new market remains high. Otherwise, the conglomerate will merge and divest intermittently.
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| 現在までの達成度 (段落) |
令和3年度が最終年度であるため、記入しない。
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| 今後の研究の推進方策 |
令和3年度が最終年度であるため、記入しない。
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