研究課題/領域番号 |
21K17726
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研究種目 |
若手研究
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配分区分 | 基金 |
審査区分 |
小区分60050:ソフトウェア関連
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研究機関 | 株式会社インターネットイニシアティブ(技術研究所) |
研究代表者 |
オブラン ピエールルイ 株式会社インターネットイニシアティブ(技術研究所), 技術研究所 技術研究室, 研究員 (00888886)
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研究期間 (年度) |
2021-04-01 – 2026-03-31
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研究課題ステータス |
交付 (2023年度)
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配分額 *注記 |
2,600千円 (直接経費: 2,000千円、間接経費: 600千円)
2025年度: 390千円 (直接経費: 300千円、間接経費: 90千円)
2024年度: 390千円 (直接経費: 300千円、間接経費: 90千円)
2023年度: 390千円 (直接経費: 300千円、間接経費: 90千円)
2022年度: 650千円 (直接経費: 500千円、間接経費: 150千円)
2021年度: 780千円 (直接経費: 600千円、間接経費: 180千円)
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キーワード | Trusted Execution / ARM TrustZone / Intel SGX / RISC-V Keystone / Online video games / TEE / Cheating |
研究開始時の研究の概要 |
Even though video games have strong performance requirements, protecting online video games by leveraging TEEs is not a trivial task due to the inherent limitations of TEEs: (i) memory size limitation; (2) no direct access to I/O operations; and (3) non-negligible performance overhead to ensure security properties of the TEE. The challenges of this research project are thus three-fold: 1) how to design an effective method to partition the game code into a secure and unsecure part, to keep the memory footprint small; 2) how to provide trusted I/O; and 3) how to ensure acceptable performance.
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研究実績の概要 |
- Several rounds of submission to Usenix S&P and CCS, but no accept so far. - Paper accepted at the SysTEX '23 workshop. - Research paper submitted to the SysTEX '24 workshop, but unfortunately not accepted. - Started working on securing I/O by leveraging the ARM TrustZone TEE so that a cheater cannot automate his gameplay (e.g., running an aimbot).
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現在までの達成度 (区分) |
現在までの達成度 (区分)
3: やや遅れている
理由
Current results have not been accepted yet to a top-level international conference, so we have to spend more time to strengthen the paper.
In parallel we are continuing working on the other tasks related to the project: small secure memory and absence of trusted I/O.
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今後の研究の推進方策 |
Small secure memory: we are actively working on the implementation and evaluation of our solution. We are currently using Qemu, but plan to eventually evaluate our solution on a real RISC-V board.
Trusted I/O: we are working on the implementation of a new system where I/O is protected against a strong attacker, so that a cheater cannot automate his cheats (e.g., running an aimbot). Results with the current prototype, leveraging ARM TrustZone, look promising.
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