| 研究実績の概要 |
1. International conference oral presentation: “Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency for Tiered Objects Preferences”, Oral presentation, 2015 Conference on Economic Design, July 4, 2015, Istanbul Bilgi University, Turkey.
2. Domestic workshop oral presentation: “"Computation of Minimum Price Walrasian Equilibrium for Non-quasi-linear Preferences: Serial Vickrey Algorithm”, 2016 Market Design Workshop, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, March 18, 2016
3. Master thesis reward: Excellent Graduate Thesis in Economics in Jiangsu Province, Education Department of Jiangsu Province, China, 2015
4. Paper publication reward: “Public Infrastructure Provision and Skilled-unskilled Wage Inequality in Developing Countries (Labour Economics, 19(6), 881-887)”, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2015
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| 現在までの達成度 (区分) |
現在までの達成度 (区分)
2: おおむね順調に進展している
理由
We consider the allocation problem of assigning heterogeneous objects to a group of agents and determining how much each agent should pay. Each agent receives at most one object. We assume (i) Agents have non-quasi-linear preferences over bundles, each consisting of an object and a payment. (ii) Case 1: Objects are linearly ranked and at each payment level, agents commonly prefer the highly ranked object to the lowly ranked one. (ii)Objects are partitioned into several tiers, and at each payment, agents commonly prefer the object in the higher tier to the one in the lower tier.
We try to identify the allocation rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality and no subsidy when agents have non-quasi-linear common-object-ranking preferences (Assumptions (i)+Case 1 of (ii)) or have non-quasi-linear common-tiered-object preferences (Assumptions (i)+Case 2 of (ii)). The minimum price rule is a rule that given each preference profile, it always selects the (Walrasian) equilibrium with the minimum price.
We establish: 1) On the non-quasi-linear and common-object-ranking domain, the minimum price rule is the only rule satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and no subsidy.2)On the non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object domain, the minimum price rule is the only rule satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and no subsidy.
I already summarize the above-mentioned results to a paper joint with my advisor. We are now revising this paper and preparing for submission in near future.
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| 今後の研究の推進方策 |
It is known that simultaneous ascending auction (SA auction) is a way to achieve the minimum price Walrasian equilibrium and for general preference settings, the minimum price Walrasian equilibrium can be obtained by the SA auction in finite steps. However, the operation of the SA auction is very complex. It may require many rounds and during each round, each bidder should truly report his true willingness to pay. Hence, it is worth investigating some other new well-behaved auctions that can easily achieve the minimum price Walrasian equilibrium.
My research steps are as follows:
Step 1: By using the sufficient and necessary conditions to guarantee the establishment of the minimum price Walrasian equilibrium, I will consider the 2 objects and n agents case.
Step 2: Then, by using the induction approach, I try to generalize the 2 objects and n agents case to the m objects and n agents case.
After I obtain the generalized results, I will present them in some international conferences.
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