| 研究実績の概要 |
The research on leniency has focused on three elements. First, the research has claimed that leniency policies may only bring relative success. Enforcement efficiency may be increased. However, cartel formation will not necessarily be deterred. It could be claimed that elements in society have a bigger impact on the pervasiveness of price fixing. Increased risk of detection will not necessarily address this issue. A solution may be to incentivize, eventually accommodated within the remedies structure, compliance programs and sessions. Second, the research has focused on competition law and leniency in Asia. One the one hand, research has been done on the conceptualization of competition law in general. The conclusion could be drawn that Asian competition laws tend to focus on unfair trade practices, more than on other forms of anti-competitive behavior. On the other hand, leniency in Asia has been investigated. Various issues have been identified that could hamper the effectiveness of leniency: uncertainty, low incentive structures, lack of confidentiality, or thwarted interactions with leniency applicants. Third, the research has been the literature claiming that algorithms will increasingly be used for price setting. Eventually, the prices set forward by the algorithms may be the result of a collusion between algorithms. The research has been looking at the consequences for leniency policies and claims that alternatives may have to be devised, such as algorithm transparency, in order to prevent collusion in the future.
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