• 研究課題をさがす
  • 研究者をさがす
  • KAKENの使い方
  1. 課題ページに戻る

2016 年度 実施状況報告書

Mechanism Design and Budget-Constrained Agents

研究課題

研究課題/領域番号 16K03545
研究機関小樽商科大学

研究代表者

小島 直樹  小樽商科大学, 商学部, 教授 (70547869)

研究期間 (年度) 2016-10-21 – 2020-03-31
キーワードMechanism Design / Revelation Principle / Budget Constraint
研究実績の概要

I published a paper "Implementability by a Canonical Indirect Mechanism of an Optimal Two-Dimensional Direct Mechanism" in Theoretical Economics Letters 07(02), 187-192, January 2017. The content to the paper does not have direct bearing upon the outline of the present project. While carrying out research, I hit on an idea which is pertinent to the project.

I have drafted another paper "General Screening Contracts to Budget-Constrained Agents", which bears directly on the project and is the first paper proposed in the project. I have got it accepted by this year's Asian and Chinese meetings of the Econometric Society. This is a paper dealing with the principal with cost faced to budget-constrained agent-buyers.

現在までの達成度 (区分)
現在までの達成度 (区分)

2: おおむね順調に進展している

理由

Research has been making headway according to plan. I have got one paper out for publication and another for presentation. The reason of smooth sailing is that the nub of the problem or the difficulty has been found to lie where I suspected it to be at the beginning of the project. There was no mishap in the process of conducting research. In other words, there was no bad surprise. I had just to bring my initial ideas into being.

今後の研究の推進方策

I will try to complete and disseminate "General Screening Contracts to Budget-Constrained Agents" everywhere possible, in particular, at prestigious international conferences and submit it to one of the top journals in the world.

I intend to extend the analysis by "General Screening Contracts to Budget-Constrained Agents" to another context. To be concrete, I mean to consider a case in which the principal designs a contract to agents with limited liabilities. This issue is quite parallel to the above paper. I reckon that the same method as in "General Screening Contracts to Budget-Constrained Agents" can be directly carried over to that problem.

  • 研究成果

    (1件)

すべて 2017

すべて 雑誌論文 (1件) (うち査読あり 1件、 オープンアクセス 1件、 謝辞記載あり 1件)

  • [雑誌論文] Implementability by a Canonical Indirect Mechanism of an Optimal Two-Dimensional Direct Mechanism2017

    • 著者名/発表者名
      Naoki Kojima
    • 雑誌名

      Theoretical Economics Letters

      巻: 07(02) ページ: 187-192

    • DOI

      10.4236/tel.2017.72016

    • 査読あり / オープンアクセス / 謝辞記載あり

URL: 

公開日: 2018-01-16  

サービス概要 検索マニュアル よくある質問 お知らせ 利用規程 科研費による研究の帰属

Powered by NII kakenhi