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2019 年度 実績報告書

Mechanism Design and Budget-Constrained Agents

研究課題

研究課題/領域番号 16K03545
研究機関福岡大学

研究代表者

小島 直樹  福岡大学, 経済学部, 教授 (70547869)

研究期間 (年度) 2016-10-21 – 2020-03-31
キーワードMechanism Design / Revelation Principle / Multi-dimension / Budget Constraints
研究実績の概要

I published a paper "Implementability by a Canonical Indirect Mechanism of an Optimal Two-Dimensional Direct Mechanism" in Theoretical Economics Letters 07(02), 187-192, January 2017. I drafted another paper "General Screening Contracts to Budget-Constrained Agents", which was the first paper proposed in the project. I got it accepted by 2017's Asian and Chinese meetings of the Econometric Society. This is a paper dealing with the principal with cost faced to budget-constrained agent-buyers.

I presented the paper "General Screening Contracts to Budget-Constrained Agents" at the Asian and Chinese meetings of the Econometric Society. I revised the paper several times and submitted it to top international journals, some of which rejected it and others requested revisions. The latest version has been submitted to the International Journal of Game Theory under the title of "Screening Contracts to Budget-Constrained Agents". The reviewers' opinions are very positive and the editor has requested a minor revision for publication.

I published another paper titled "Two-Dimensional Mechanism Design and Implementability by an Indirect Mechanism" in Theoretical Economics Letters 07(06), pp1595-pp1601, October 2017.

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公開日: 2021-01-27  

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