| 研究実績の概要 |
We began this study with a goal to do both theory and empirical analysis on how limited-tenure (on the landlord's side) affects sharecropping contracts and consequently the political business cycles at the village level. We successfully met all the goals planned for FY2017.
During the process of detailed literature survey and field survey work, we realized that this plan provided only a partial picture on contract mechanism design since we did not consider other types of farming contracts than sharecropping. As a result, we decided to consider a holistic picture of farming contract design, including both fixed-rent and sharecropping arrangements. This enabled us to answer an equally interesting question: “what the preferred mode of farming is facing limited tenure?” This research question was also related to the debate on relative efficiency in sharecropping versus fixed rent contracts. Having fixed-rent arrangements in the study made the research design rich. We then needed to have questions on how political business cycles were linked to such choices. For example, 1. Do Bengkok land owners prefer sharecropping over fixed-rent when incumbent reelection is nearing? 2. Does the fixed-rent rates vary from one tenure year to another (say from year 1 to year 4)? 3. Do bengkok landlords switch between sharecropping and fixed-rent, if so then why? 4. How contract mechanism differs between "Bengkok-cum-nonBengkok landlords" and "Bengkok sharecropping landlords"?
|
| 現在までの達成度 (区分) |
現在までの達成度 (区分)
2: おおむね順調に進展している
理由
In the FY2017, we achieved all the planned targets. The major success was to complete field survey. We briefly describe the key features of our field survey.
Village Selection - to do the sampling exercise for village selection, we selected 10 districts in the eastern part of the Central Java (Wonogiri, Klaten, Sukoharjo, Karanganyar, Sragen, Boyolali, Grobogan, Rembang, Pati, Kudus) and 3 districts in the western part of the bordering East Java (Ngawi, Magetan, and Pacitan). Within each district, using the most recent agricultural statistics, we first looked at the wet land (for paddy) and dry land agricultural area. Within each district we repeated the same approach, using the most recent agricultural statistics, to randomly select villages.
Procedure of sampling within a village - from information from the village office of selected villages, we created the list of Bengkok sharecroppers. We randomly surveyed 7 out of them. As a result, we had 10 sample sharecroppers (7 Bengkok, 3 non-Bengkok) from each sample village. Our sample non-Bengkok sharecroppers are chosen under the criterion that they do not cultivate Bengkok land and they live in a Dusun where our sample Bengkok sharecropper lives. But the motivation of collecting information on non-Bengkok sharecroppers is for econometric test of theories.
Choice of 2 plots for detailed input-output survey - for each sample sharecropper, we will collect detailed information on inputs and outputs on 2 plots. The choice of 2 plots depends on the type of sharecroppers.
|
| 今後の研究の推進方策 |
In the next FY, our primary goal is to analyze the data and try to find out 1. how fixed-rent contracts are linked to limited-tenure, and 2. how sharecropping contracts are linked to limited-tenure and 3. how the interplay between fixed-rent and sharecropping evolves with limited-tenure, among others. The main data sample consists of Contract-wise: 910 contracts (N=130 villages ×7 contract pairs) and Household-wise: 1,820 households (N=130 villages ×14 households). We plan to get summary statistics by plot types that are divided into five categories: 1) Bengkok land with sharecropping contract 2) Benkok land with fixed rent contract 3) non-Bengkok land with sharecropping contract 4) non-Bengkok land with fixed rent contract 5) owned plots
We also like to check for the following issues: （A) Household data from replaced-villages: about 70 households - we did not include them in the main data due to the following reasons: small land sizes, lack of rice field plots, and lack of rental farmland. （B) Secondary data is also available - we did not visit villages due to the following reasons: dry land and harvest seasons were different.
Research Questions that we like to answer: a) What are the implications on contract theory with the limited tenure? b) Are productivities different between sharecropped and tenanted plots? c) Does contract type vary depending on periods in the election cycle? d) Does cognitive skill affect contract type?
Finally, we plan to produce two papers on the above topics.
|
