| 研究実績の概要 |
The aim of this project is provide an efficient and incentive-compatible auctions beyond quasi-linearity, supported by both theoretical analysis and experiment test.
In the first year, I made some progress for the theoretical part. The theoretical part contains two results. The first result is accepted to be published in an internationally well-established journal, Games and Economic Behavior.
I have almost completed my second result and started to present it in several conferences and seminars, such as GSBE-ETBC seminar (Maastricht U), Hitotsubashi-Osaka Economic Theory Workshop (Hitotsubashi U) and International Conference on Game Theory and the Fourth Microeconomics Workshop (Nanjing Audit U). During my presentations, several researchers gave me valuable comments, which improved my result a lot. Some of them are also interested in extending my result in more general settings. This provides me some chances to work with them and enrich my research achievements for this project.
In sum, everything goes on well for this project, as expected.
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| 今後の研究の推進方策 |
I will complete the main paper supported by this project in a few month and then submit this paper to some international peer-viewed journal. Moreover, before submission, I am going to present this paper in one or two international conferences.
In addition, I am now also making preparation for the experiment. I believe my mechanism generally can compete with any existing mechanisms.
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