| 研究実績の概要 |
In this year, I extend my theoretical model by considering the combined effects of employment protection on different types of labor. This model considers workers’ heterogeneity in skill, the search frictions and workers’ decision on the labor market participation. These features make the model capture the policy effect on the flows in the labor market more comprehensively.
Using the calibrated model, I conduct simulations to assess the effects of skill-biased partial reforms. Some important findings are as follows: First, the labor reforms ( by reducing the employment protections on either skilled or unskilled workers) increase aggregate output and firms’ productivity and equilibrium wages, due to more efficient allocations of production factors. Second, the labor reforms do not necessarily raise the employment, because of two opposite forces: a rise in the labor force participation rate and a rise in firms' firing rate. Third, the reform is most effective when conducted in a sclerotic labor market. In contrast, the reform can achieve negligible effects in a moderately regulated labor market. Fourth, the reform that aims to reduce skilled workers’ firing cost can lead to much stronger favorable effects―the rise in output, productivity, employment, and welfare―than the reforms targeting to unskilled workers.
The complete working paper has been posted on-line and presented in two international conferences. After revision, this paper will be presented in the Western Economic Association conference in Portland, U.S. this June.
|
