2002 Fiscal Year Final Research Report Summary
Prevention of Moral Hazard and the Financial System in the 21st Century
Project/Area Number |
12630095
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Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
Section | 一般 |
Research Field |
Public finance/Monetary economics
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Research Institution | Hitotsubashi University |
Principal Investigator |
SHIMIZU Yoshinori Hitotsubashi University, Graduate School of Commerce and Management, Professor, 大学院・商学研究科, 教授 (70114949)
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Project Period (FY) |
2000 – 2002
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Keywords | Moral hazard / Financial Crisis / Legal regulation / Fiscal cost / Bank management / Mega-bank merger / TBTDA(Too-Big-to-Discipline-Adequately) / land price |
Research Abstract |
This research is based on the idea that prevention of moral hazard is crucial in dealing with financial crises that are ever increasing in terms of the size of fiscal cost to fix the problem. Moral hazard in the financial market is globally common, especially after deregulation of financial market which was prompted by a rapid progress in the IT technology. We have made an extensive research for the common causes, phenomena and the remedies of recent financial crises in different parts of the world. We have found that the scale of financial crises become larger due to the same causes during the process of change in regulatory system. The key to cope with the problem is a prevention of moral hazard. We have proposed policy measures to suppress moral hazard effectively and systematically. A new type of moral hazard is found in the case of mega-bank mergers that became so common after 1990s. Japan suffers from the most serious financial crises in terms of the fiscal cost, and has largest banks in the world as well. We found an evidence of moral hazard which may exists recent mega-bank mergers in Japan. This finding has a very important implication to the banking policy. We have proposed some guidelines for healthier bank management to establish a more sound banking system.
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