2004 Fiscal Year Final Research Report Summary
Development of Corporate Reorganization and Reform of Merger Control
| Project/Area Number |
15530039
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Social law
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| Research Institution | Hitotsubashi University |
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Principal Investigator |
YAMABE Toshifumi Hitotsubashi University, Graduate School of Law, Professor, 大学院・法学研究科, 教授 (50183984)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2003 – 2004
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| Keywords | merger and acquisition / merger control / market power / creation or strengthening of market power / substantial restriction of competition / external growth / performance-based competition / test of competition |
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| Research Abstract |
The purpose of this research is to reexamine the principle of merger control of Antimonopoly Law, in order to regulate appropriately mergers of huge undertakings which are increasing recently. The problems are chiefly taken up in the article of "A note on some basic problems regarding merger control". The article is a summary of the result of the research in 2003 fiscal year.
From the standpoint of competition law and policy, the creation or strengthening of market power by merger is undoubtedly anti-competitive, and such a merger should be prohibited. Affording market power is the one of the principal bases for controlling mergers, but it is insufficient for theoretic basis of the regulation. If creation or strengthening of market power in itself should be condemned, creation or strengthening of market power by internal growth of an undertaking grounded on performance-based competition should be also condemned as well as by external growth, i.e. merger. The law, however, does not prohibit creation or strengthening of market power by internal growth. Mergers create enlargement of scale and/or scope of the merging firms. But the enlargement does not rest upon performance-based competition. Mergers invite the growth of merging firms without the test of competition at the market of goods or services. Mergers might also be regarded negatively as a method of competition, and this might be another principal and theoretical basis for merger control. For that reason, it is not necessary to take the improvement in efficiency, which is brought about by expansion of scale and/or scope of business of the merging firms, into consideration for merger control. In addition, about the substantive regulation standard, it is clarified that proof of concrete progress of use of market power has been required.
The subsequent result of the research is due to be published in November 2005 or later.
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Research Products
(6 results)
