2006 Fiscal Year Final Research Report Summary
Contemporary Issues on the Regulation against Abuse of A Dominant Bargaining Position
Project/Area Number |
15530040
|
Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
Section | 一般 |
Research Field |
Social law
|
Research Institution | Kyoto University |
Principal Investigator |
KAWAHAMA Noboru Kyoto University, Graduate School of Law, Professor, 大学院法学研究科, 教授 (60204749)
|
Project Period (FY) |
2003 – 2006
|
Keywords | abuse of a dominant bargaining position / exploitive abuse / exclusionary practice / market power / market power analysis / compliance program / incomplete contract / hold-up |
Research Abstract |
Many people say that the Regulation against abuse of a dominant bargaining position is unique Japanese-style Regulation. In the first place, a dominant bargaining position dose not mean a dominant position in a market. It contains asymmetric bargaining power caused by the transaction-relationship specific situations. In the second place, abusive conducts dose not mean anti-competitive conduct. It contains exploitive conduct. At one time, we had no theoretical explanation for a dominant bargaining position. Recently some economist explains it as a case of hold-up problem or post-contractual opportunism. In this research project, we accept this perspective. But we insist that the regulation works for the protection of the reasonable expectations of bounded rational parties. Usually a dominant bargaining position means a bargaining power between contracting parties, but it contains dominant position in the market. In order to analyse a dominant bargaining position in this perspective, I elaborate a method of market power analysis. For the second place, I shows that the abuse should contain both exploitive and exclusive. Some abusive practice have both traits. So we should accept both perspective in order to regulate abuse of a dominant position properly.
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Research Products
(12 results)