2010 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

Study on the role of protocols in legislative bargaining : Noncooperative game approach

Research Project

Project/Area Number	21830145
Research Category	Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up
Allocation Type	Single-year Grants
Research Field	Economic theory
Research Institution	Osaka University of Economics
Principal Investigator	KAWAMORI Tomohiko Osaka University of Economics, 経済学部, 講師 (70550531)
Project Period (FY)	2009 – 2010
Keywords	提携形成 / 交渉 / ゲーム理論
Research Abstract	This study investigates a legislative bargaining model in which the rejecter in the previous round becomes the proposer in the current round. We allow the time and risk preferences to differ across players and the voting quota to be a supermajority or submajority. We show that there exists a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium and that each player's equilibrium payoff conditional on being a proposer is unique, and we explicitly derive the equilibria and equilibrium payoff. We compare a proposer's equilibrium payoff when the time interval between two consecutive rounds tends to zero with respect to the protocols of the selection of proposers and the voting quota.