An examination of collective action problems with intra-group heterogeneity by the share function approach

2024 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 21K01550
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Section: 一般
• Review Section: Basic Section 07050:Public economics and labor economics-related
• Research Institution: Nanzan University
• Principal Investigator: Ueda Kaoru 南山大学, 経済学部, 教授 (40203434)
• Project Period (FY): 2021-04-01 – 2025-03-31
• Keywords: group contest / prize allocation rule / intragroup heterogeneity / complementarity / internal structure / endogenous prize / group cost minimization

Outline of Final Research Achievements

The theory of group contests considers the contests by groups suffering from the collective action problems. It is applicable to various economic and political competitions in society: lobbying by interest groups, competition by sports teams in a sports league, R&D competition by firms, and so on. This research tries to introduce many kinds of heterogeneity (abilities, roles in an organization, attitudes to risk) and complementarity of the members in a group to the models of group contests and examine the implications. As the most important product, a paper on the group contest in which competing groups can contain internal structures is published, which derives a simple characterization of the team-effort-maximizing prize-sharing rule.

Free Research Field

microeconomics, game theory

Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements

集団コンテストのモデルは、ロビー活動、スポーツリーグ、技術開発競争など、様々な経済的政治的競合過程の分析に用いることができる。公刊論文で示された、複数の内部集団を包含した構造を有する集団によるコンテストのモデルは、こうした競合過程にある集団の組織構造と報酬体系に関する議論を一層精緻で豊かなものにする。また、集団への帰属意識や貢献能力の異なる構成員の間の、業務割り当てに関するモデル分析への展望も開くものである。