2013 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Bargaining Game Theory of Strategic Coalition Formation and Incomplete Information
| Project/Area Number |
23530232
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Osaka University of Economics |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2011 – 2013
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| Keywords | 非協力交渉ゲーム / 提携形成 / 外部性 / 不完備情報 / ナッシュ交渉解 / コア / 非対称情報 |
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| Research Abstract |
The aim of this research is to investigate strategic aspects of coalition formations and conditions to realize the efficient outcome, by applying new methods in bargaining game theory, in the situations where there exist externalities among coalitions. Moreover, we examine the solution concepts of the cooperative and noncooperative games for the bargaining problem with incomplete information and consider the problem of mechanism design. The research consists of the following three topics:
(1)Strategic coalition formation and a noncooperative bargaining game model: We present a non-cooperative bargaining game model in the partition function form game and examine the relationships between a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium, Nash bargaining solutions and core. We apply it to the problem of free trade agreements. (2)Definition of Nash bargaining solution for the bargaining problem with incomplete information. (3)Mechanism design and coalition formations under asymmetric information.
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Research Products
(9 results)
