Analysis of sustainability of farmer's participatory irrigation system by game theory

2014 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 23580287
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Section: 一般
• Research Field: Agro-economics
• Research Institution: Hokkaido University
• Principal Investigator: KONDO Takumi 北海道大学, (連合)農学研究科(研究院), 教授 (40178413)
• Project Period (FY): 2011-04-28 – 2015-03-31
• Keywords: ネパール / 灌漑 / 共有資源

Outline of Final Research Achievements

This paper is about irrigation development, and its management-performance influence on agricultural production. The focus is on systems in Nepal and Indonesia, incorporating Ostrom’s design principles and game theory. Better-managed irrigation systems all but satisfy Ostrom’s principle criterion. Even with the design principle not satisfied, one irrigation system in Nepal was maintained - albeit incompletely - albeit incompletely - through the efforts of voluntary downstream farmers. We analyze this situation by applying chicken game theory, and find that upstream farmers are free-riding on downstream farmers. As the cost of maintenance of the system increases due to rising wages and the dilapidated state of the waterway, downstream farmers are unable to maintain the system without the cooperation of upstream farmers. We conclude by showing that irrigation systems may deteriorate depending on the strategy of upstream farmers.

Free Research Field

農業経済学