2016 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
An experimental study on repeated games with observation costs
| Project/Area Number |
24530199
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Kobe University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2012-04-01 – 2017-03-31
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| Keywords | 繰り返しゲーム / 観測費用 / 囚人のジレンマ |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
In this research, we study reputation effect in long-run relationship by using game theory. There are two decision makers (players), and they play prisoner's dilemma game every period. Each player can decide whether to cooperate or defect in each period. If a player pays a cost, he knows the action chosen by the opponent in that period. Otherwise, he cannot knows the action. At the beginning of the repeated game, there is a possibility that a player commits to a certain strategy. That is, a player's strategy is fixed with an exogenously given probability. Such player is called commitment type. If a player is not a commitment type, he can choose any strategy. The objective of the research is to analyze how players play the repeated game in this situation.
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| Free Research Field |
ゲーム理論
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