Voluntarily Separable Repeated Public Goods Provision

2015 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 24530361
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Section: 一般
• Research Field: Public finance/Monetary economics
• Research Institution: Komazawa University
• Principal Investigator: Suzuki Nobue 駒澤大学, 経済学部, 教授 (90365536)
• Project Period (FY): 2012-04-01 – 2016-03-31
• Keywords: 自発的継続ゲーム / 公共財 / クラブ財 / 囚人のジレンマ / 離脱可能性 / 繰り返しゲーム

Outline of Final Research Achievements

This research project studied how efficiency can be enhanced in the two-person and more-than two-person voluntarily separable Prisoner’s Dilemma models. It has been shown that, in more-than two-person models as well as in two-person models, when a certain condition holds, equilibrium involving both cooperative and non-cooperative strategies is more efficient than equilibrium with cooperative strategies only. There have also been some findings concerning relationship between equilibrium efficiency and group rules which are specific to more-than two-person models.

Free Research Field

公共経済学