Endogenous Determinations of Monitoring Structure and Behavioral Analysis of Cooperative Equilibria in Repeated Game Models

2018 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 26380238
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Section: 一般
• Research Field: Economic theory
• Research Institution: Kyoto University
• Principal Investigator: Sekiguchi Tadashi 京都大学, 経済研究所, 教授 (20314461)
• Project Period (FY): 2014-04-01 – 2019-03-31
• Keywords: 繰り返しゲーム / 不完全観測 / 多市場接触 / カルテル / 再帰的効用 / チーム生産 / 観測オプション / 不完備情報

Outline of Final Research Achievements

In the theory of repeated games as economic models of long-run relationships, I distinguished myself by departing from recent trends which somewhat excessively focused on purely mathematical theorems, and I conducted research which led to understanding of economic agents’ information acquisition activities and explaining economic phenomena in reality. Especially, I examined whether multimarket contact, where oligopolistic firms operated in multiple markets at the same time, facilitated collusion in itself. I showed that multimarket contact strongly facilitated collusion in cases of demand fluctuations and imperfect observability of rival firms’ actions. Further, in repeated partnership models, I characterized the sharing rule which most effectively provided incentives to make an effort.

Free Research Field

ゲーム理論・ミクロ経済学

Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements

本研究課題の研究成果は、数学的に高度な定理の導出にやや過度に集中してきた繰り返しゲームの理論を独自の視点から新しく発展させるもので、その学術的意義は大きい。また、多市場接触のカルテル促進効果に関する研究成果は、一見無関係に思える複数の市場で寡占企業が同時に操業する事実がカルテル達成の推進力であることを示唆し、規制当局に対して極めて重要な視座を提供している。更に、長期的関係にあるチーム生産モデルで努力インセンティブを最も効果的に与える成果分配ルールを特徴付ける研究成果は、メンバー間の能力面での違いを明示的に考慮しているため、現実の職場での動機づけ・規律づけへの応用可能性が見込める。