| Project/Area Number |
15K03358
|
|---|
| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
|
| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
|---|
| Section | 一般 |
|---|
| Research Field |
Economic theory
|
|---|
| Research Institution | Dokkyo University (2017-2018)
Takasaki City University of Economics (2015-2016) |
|---|
Principal Investigator |
|
|---|
| Research Collaborator |
Iwata Kazuyuki
|
|---|
| Project Period (FY) |
2015-04-01 – 2019-03-31
|
| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2018)
|
| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,420,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,020,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,950,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥450,000)
|
|---|
| Keywords | コミュニケーション / チープトーク / 労使交渉 / 不完備契約 / モラルハザード / 社会的選好 / 自己奉仕バイアス / 経済実験 / 労使紛争 / 不平等回避理論 / モラル・ハザード |
|---|
| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
In this study, we conduct laboratory experiments based on a one-shot gift exchange game in the context of firm-worker relationships. Our design admits two types of worker proposals on the contracts to his/her firm, defined as cheap talk. One contains only the desirable wage of the worker, while the other additionally contains his/her future effort. We find that worker preferences become biased in a more self-serving direction by making proposals in bargaining. That is, both types of worker cheap talk undermine reciprocity, thus deteriorating efficiency in an incomplete contract. Additional experiments show that the negative effect of cheap talk in bargaining is robust even for repeated interactions. By contrast, worker proposals including future efforts lead to successful coordination, which outweigh the negative effect on reciprocal behaviors.
|
| Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements |
交渉を含む事前コミュニケーションの負の側面はこれまでにも指摘されてきたが、コミュニケーションが発話者自身の互恵的選好を毀損することで経済効率性を悪化させる可能性を示したのは本研究がはじめてである。とくに、本実験研究のベースとなったモラルハザード問題は、労使関係だけでなく、医師と患者、政治家と官僚、学生と教員の利害対立など、プリンシパル・エージェント関係全般に発生するものであり、本研究の応用範囲は広い。その成果は、プリンシパルとエージェントの利害対立を緩和するコミュニケーションのあり方や制度設計を検討する際の一助となるものである。
|
