| Project/Area Number |
15K03361
|
|---|
| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
|
| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
|---|
| Section | 一般 |
|---|
| Research Field |
Economic theory
|
|---|
| Research Institution | Hosei University |
|---|
Principal Investigator |
|
|---|
| Project Period (FY) |
2015-04-01 – 2018-03-31
|
| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2017)
|
| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,470,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥570,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
|
|---|
| Keywords | 公共財 / 戦略的委託 / 交渉 / 投票制度 / 補助金政策 / 政治経済学 / 補助金 / パレート効率性 / 外部性 / リンダール価格 / 公共事業 / スピルオーバー / 自発的供給 |
|---|
| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We examine a situation in which two regions cooperatively provide a public good through negotiation. The negotiation is conducted by representatives, who are elected from each region. It is well-known as a strategic delegation problem that each region strategically elects its representative and as a result, the public good is inefficiently provided through negotiation. In this study, first, we strictly reevaluate how serious the problem is. Then, we show that this problem can be solved through the central government policy that combines a cost-matching grant for public good provision and reelection after the negotiation breaks down.
|
