Technology Licensing through Bargaining under Various Market Structures
| Project/Area Number |
15K17017
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Chiba University |
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Principal Investigator |
Kishimoto Shin 千葉大学, 大学院社会科学研究院, 准教授 (00610560)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2015-04-01 – 2018-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2017)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,470,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥570,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
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| Keywords | ミクロ経済学 / 協力ゲーム理論 / 技術移転 / ライセンス契約 / 交渉 / 寡占市場 / 製品差別化 / 2部料金 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
This study theoretically analyzes agreements on technology licensing that result from bargaining among a technology holder and firms (potential licensees) in an oligopoly market. First, I formulate negotiations on a two-part tariff (a combination of lump-sum fee and per-unit royalty) as a cooperative game model that includes the various situations studied in the literature, and show the properties of stable two-part tariffs that are realized through bargaining. Second, I examine the effect on social welfare of the relative bargaining power between a technology holder and a potential licensee in a duopoly market.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(7 results)
