| Project/Area Number |
16K02014
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Area studies
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|---|
| Research Institution | Waseda University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2016-04-01 – 2019-03-31
|
| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2018)
|
| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,680,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,080,000)
Fiscal Year 2018: ¥1,690,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥390,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥2,210,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥510,000)
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| Keywords | スウェーデン / 社会の透明性 / 腐敗・汚職 / レント / インセンティブ |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
Bigger government has lager “rents” and thus rent-seeking activities are more vigorous there. When the rents are greater, both the benefit and the opportunity to send/receive a bribe is larger and thus the possibilities for corruption tend to increase. However, this research found that transparency is irrelevant to the size of rent. This research has confirmed empirically that transparency is heavily related to the monitoring intensity on corruption. For example, the high monitoring intensity on corruption in Sweden is achieved via information disclosure laws, the personal numbering system, constant monitoring from the media etc.. Theoretical analysis shows the possibility that bigger government does not always bring about an increase in corruption.
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| Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements |
「大きな政府」などに起因するレントが、腐敗・汚職行為を誘発しているわけではなく、腐敗・汚職行為を監視するモニタリング機能（監視機能）が低いことが腐敗・汚職行為を誘発している。スウェーデンで行われているような「徹底した情報の公開」、「国民背番号制（個人ID番号）の採用」、「メディアの独立性と監視機能強化」が実現すれば、スウェーデンのような腐敗・汚職行為の少ない透明性の高い社会が実現可能である。このことを導出できたことが、本研究の学術的意義と社会的意義といえる。
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