| Project/Area Number |
16K03550
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Taisho University |
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Principal Investigator |
IMAI HARUO 大正大学, 地域創生学部, 教授 (10144396)
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| Research Collaborator |
Hannu Salonen
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| Project Period (FY) |
2016-04-01 – 2019-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2018)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,420,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,020,000)
Fiscal Year 2018: ¥1,560,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥360,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
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| Keywords | 多数決 / 交渉 / レントシーキング / 格差 / 多数決交渉 / 非対称均衡 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We analysed a sequential bargaining game a la Baron-Ferejon with the preceding stage where investments by players determine respective recognition probabilities endogenously. With symmetric investment costs, any symmetric equilibrium cannot be achieved by pure strategies, under the majoritarian rule. In this project, we investigate the non-symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies, and based on it, we tried to analyse the properties of the majoritarian rules as the source to create inequalities.
Instead of mixed strategy equilibria for the symmetric case, we show equilibria with pure but asymmetric investment strategies by means of equilibria involving extreme strategies. In order to clarify the nature of the inequality produced by these equilibria, the robustness of the majority coalition under the repeated bargaining is the key. As a foothold to analyse this issue from the theoretical standpoint, restriction of the object of negotiation to the policy issue space would be viable.
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| Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements |
格差についての多くの議論は、格差自身は自由市場のプロセスによって生み出されるという見解が中心であって、民主主義的な政治過程は、これを修正する方向に働くという見方が多数派であったと思われる。本研究では、民主主義の下での多数派形成過程もランダム性発生装置となりえて、結果として、（たとえ平等な出発点があったとして）格差を生み出す仕組みの一つとなりうることを、交渉の理論分析の応用から示す。
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