The Interaction of the Allocation of Authority and Relational Contracts in Organizations
Project/Area Number |
17K13724
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Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
Research Field |
Economic policy
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Research Institution | The University of Tokyo (2019-2020) National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (2017-2018) |
Principal Investigator |
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Project Period (FY) |
2017-04-01 – 2021-03-31
|
Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2020)
|
Budget Amount *help |
¥4,030,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥930,000)
Fiscal Year 2019: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2018: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
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Keywords | 組織の経済学 / 契約理論 / 経済政策 / 経済理論 |
Outline of Final Research Achievements |
With regard to the two central issues in the research proposal, I found the following. (1) I analyzed the interaction between relational contracting and delegation of authority in situations where the decision makers' preferences differ, and found a relationship between delegation of authority and discounting factors, which is consistent with existing empirical studies. (2) I analyzed the interaction of delegation of authority in situations where the decision makers' opinions may differ, showed that it may be impossible to delegate authority informally, such as using subordinates' information to avoid subordinates reporting their opinions to their superiors, and suggested that this mechanism may explain some case studies.
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Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements |
組織における関係者間での権限の配置と関係的(暗黙的)契約の影響、およびその相互関係を明らかにすることに貢献した。とりわけ、垂直的構造を持つ組織での権限委譲を中心に考察し、関係者間で利害・意見・情報等が異なる環境において、意思決定の権限の配置と関係的契約を通じたインセンティブ供給への影響を理論的な側面から明らかにした。これらの発見は、いくつかの実証・事例研究と整合的であることを確認したとともに、現実の経営管理方針の補完性を明らかにした。
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Report
(5 results)
Research Products
(39 results)