| Project/Area Number |
17K13760
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Research Field |
Money/ Finance
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| Research Institution | Tokyo Institute of Technology |
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Principal Investigator |
Ikeda Naoshi 東京工業大学, 工学院, 助教 (90725243)
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| Research Collaborator |
Inoue Kotaro
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| Project Period (FY) |
2017-04-01 – 2019-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2018)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,210,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥510,000)
Fiscal Year 2018: ¥390,000 (Direct Cost: ¥300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥90,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥1,820,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥420,000)
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| Keywords | 経営者 / リスク回避度 / 固有リスク / 報酬体系 / 異質性 / 投資行動 / 楽観度 / 企業金融 / 経営者の異質性 / リスク回避 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
When previous studies analyze the relationship between compensation scheme and corporate behavior, they do not explicitly consider the personal risk aversion of executives. We directly measure the degree of risk aversion by a survey with Japanese data. We find that the higher the personal risk aversion of CFOs, the lower the level of high-risk investment. We also find that this effect of the risk aversion on investment is strengthened when the portfolio of CFOs is less diversified and weakened by the compensation scheme with a convex payoff.
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| Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements |
本研究では、経営幹部のリスク回避度が高ければ相対的に投資水準が低くなること、そして、凸型のペイオフを持つ報酬体系を導入することで、この影響が緩和されることを明らかにした。この成果は、報酬体系を適切に設計することによって、経営者のリスク回避度と追加的な固有リスク負担が原因の過少投資問題を緩和し、社会的に望ましい投資行動を達成できる可能性を示唆している。
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