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Empirical study of collusion

Research Project

Project/Area Number 18H03643
Research Category

Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A)

Allocation TypeSingle-year Grants
Section一般
Review Section Medium-sized Section 7:Economics, business administration, and related fields
Research InstitutionKindai University

Principal Investigator

nakabayashi jun  近畿大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (30565792)

Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) 広瀬 要輔  明治学院大学, 経済学部, 助教 (10761398)
西脇 雅人  大阪大学, 経済学研究科, 准教授 (80599259)
Project Period (FY) 2018-04-01 – 2021-03-31
Project Status Completed (Fiscal Year 2021)
Budget Amount *help
¥39,650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥30,500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥9,150,000)
Fiscal Year 2020: ¥13,780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥10,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥3,180,000)
Fiscal Year 2019: ¥14,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥10,800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥3,240,000)
Fiscal Year 2018: ¥11,830,000 (Direct Cost: ¥9,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥2,730,000)
Keywords談合 / 繰り返しゲーム / 識別 / 協調行動 / 競争政策 / スクリーニング
Outline of Final Research Achievements

We conducted theoretical and empirical analyses of bid rigging by collecting the bidding results of public works projects by more than 1,700 local governments across Japan to construct an unprecedentedly large data set and. Specifically, 1) we proposed a new method to identify collusion from the data, and 2) we used quasi-experiments and other statistical methods to verify how collusion is established, maintained, and collapse, suggested in theoretical studies of repeated games. It is expected to open up a new field of practice where competition authorities and corporate compliance departments can screen data for collusion. In addition, the results of 2) can be fed back to the theoretical analysis of repetitive games to further develop theoretical research, which is expected to be applied to the design of bidding systems to deter bid-rigging.

Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements

1)で提案した談合の識別手法は、企業ごとの談合参加の有無などに関して、既存の手法よりも高い精度で判定することができ、競争当局や企業のコンプライアンス部門が談合をデータからスクリーニングするという新たな実務分野を開拓することが期待される。また2)については、その結果を繰り返しゲームの理論分析にフィードバックすることを通じて、理論研究を一層発展させることが可能となり、さらには談合を抑止する入札制度設計に応用されることが期待される。

Report

(4 results)
  • 2021 Final Research Report ( PDF )
  • 2020 Annual Research Report
  • 2019 Annual Research Report
  • 2018 Annual Research Report
  • Research Products

    (8 results)

All 2022 2019 Other

All Int'l Joint Research (2 results) Journal Article (3 results) (of which Int'l Joint Research: 3 results,  Peer Reviewed: 2 results,  Open Access: 2 results) Presentation (3 results) (of which Int'l Joint Research: 2 results)

  • [Int'l Joint Research] UC Berkeley(米国)

    • Related Report
      2019 Annual Research Report
  • [Int'l Joint Research] University of California Berkeley/New York University/Boston University(米国)

    • Related Report
      2018 Annual Research Report
  • [Journal Article] Robust Screens for Noncompetitive Bidding in Procurement Auctions2022

    • Author(s)
      Chassang Sylvain、Kawai Kei、Nakabayashi Jun、Ortner Juan
    • Journal Title

      Econometrica

      Volume: 90 Issue: 1 Pages: 315-346

    • DOI

      10.3982/ecta17155

    • Related Report
      2020 Annual Research Report
    • Peer Reviewed / Open Access / Int'l Joint Research
  • [Journal Article] Search and resale frictions in a two-sided online platform: A case of multi-use assets2019

    • Author(s)
      Yoshimoto and Nakabayashi
    • Journal Title

      Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

      Volume: 162 Pages: 85-105

    • DOI

      10.1016/j.jebo.2019.04.013

    • Related Report
      2019 Annual Research Report
    • Peer Reviewed / Int'l Joint Research
  • [Journal Article] Data Driven Regulation: Theory and Application to Missing Bids2019

    • Author(s)
      Sylvain Chassang, Kei Kawai, Jun Nakabayashi, Juan M. Ortner
    • Journal Title

      NBER

      Volume: 25654 Pages: 1-55

    • Related Report
      2018 Annual Research Report
    • Open Access / Int'l Joint Research
  • [Presentation] Data Driven Regulation: Theory and Application to Missing Bids2019

    • Author(s)
      中林 純
    • Organizer
      日本経済学会春季大会
    • Related Report
      2019 Annual Research Report
  • [Presentation] An Empirical Analysis of Upstream Collusion in Vertically Related Industries,2019

    • Author(s)
      Masato Nishiwaki
    • Organizer
      2019 Royal Economic Society Annual Conference, April, 15-17, 2019, University of Warwick.
    • Related Report
      2019 Annual Research Report
    • Int'l Joint Research
  • [Presentation] An Empirical Analysis of Upstream Collusion in Vertically Related Industries2019

    • Author(s)
      Masato Nishiwaki
    • Organizer
      34 Jornadas de Economia Industrial, September, 5-6, 2019, Universidad Complutense de Madrid.
    • Related Report
      2019 Annual Research Report
    • Int'l Joint Research

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Published: 2018-04-23   Modified: 2023-01-30  

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