Performance of mechanisms for providing public goods and learning of equilibrium strategies : A theoretical and experimental study.
Project/Area Number |
19530164
|
Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
|
Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
Section | 一般 |
Research Field |
Economic theory
|
Research Institution | Tenri University |
Principal Investigator |
SOYAMA Noriko Tenri University, 人間学部・総合教育研究センター, 准教授 (50309522)
|
Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
MORI Toru 名古屋市立大学, 大学院・経済学研究科, 教授 (60134160)
|
Project Period (FY) |
2007 – 2009
|
Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2009)
|
Budget Amount *help |
¥4,290,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥990,000)
Fiscal Year 2009: ¥1,690,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥390,000)
Fiscal Year 2008: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2007: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
|
Keywords | 実験経済学 / 公共的意思決定 / 探索行動 / Nash均衡戦略 / supermodularity / 公共的意志決定 / Groves-Ledyardメカニズム / ピボタル・メカニズム |
Research Abstract |
In this research, we investigated the performance of Pivotal mechanisms and attainability of Nash equilibrium through Groves-Ledyard mechanism by the experimental economics method. Two points to mention in the following can be shown as this research result. 1) Pivotal mechanism, which is applied to problem of providing size of public products changing continuously under the strictly concave evaluation function can generate the payoff structure, has no best response other than truth-telling as dominant strategy, therefore it achieves the best performance under adaptive processes for learning dominant strategy. 2) In the Groves-Ledyard mechanism, punishment parameter γ is required value over the minimum value of convergence condition under Nash behavior, however individual behavior strategies can converge to Nash equilibrium under low γ less than high γ which is able to satisfy supermodurality.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(6 results)