| Project/Area Number |
19730189
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Research Field |
Applied economics
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| Research Institution | Osaka University of Economics and Law |
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Principal Investigator |
MAEZURU Masakazu Osaka University of Economics and Law, 経済学部, 准教授 (50351680)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2007 – 2009
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2009)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥1,900,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2009: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2008: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2007: ¥600,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000)
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| Keywords | 不確実性 / 環境政策 / 確率微分ゲーム / 排出量規制 / 越境汚染 |
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| Research Abstract |
The purpose of this research is to investigate a stochastic differential game of transboundary pollution and environmental policy. Emitted pollutants will remain in the environment adding to the existing pollution stock. Each government controls its amount of pollutant.
We formulate stochastic differential games, which need to be solved by two asymmetric governments involved, and derive unique Markov-perfect Nash and cooperative equilibrium solutions. Subsequently, we propose a mechanism for deriving the payoff distribution procedures of subgame consistent solutions in cooperative stochastic differential games of two governments, and a subgame consistent solution based on the Nash bargaining axioms is derived.
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