Mechanism Design in Economic Environments

• Project/Area Number: 20530147
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• Allocation Type: Single-year Grants
• Section: 一般
• Research Field: Economic theory
• Research Institution: Tohoku University
• Principal Investigator: OHSETO Shinji 東北大学, 大学院・経済学研究科, 教授 (00278475)
• Project Period (FY): 2008 – 2012
• Project Status: Completed (Fiscal Year 2012)
• Budget Amount: ¥4,160,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥960,000); Fiscal Year 2012: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000); Fiscal Year 2011: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000); Fiscal Year 2010: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000); Fiscal Year 2009: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000); Fiscal Year 2008: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
• Keywords: メカニズム・デザイン / 非分割財 / 排除可能な公共財 / 相互評価 / 戦略的操作不可能性

Research Abstract

This research mainly studies the problem of mechanism design in economic environments. First, we show the nonexistence of desirable mechanisms for the problem of allocating a single indivisible good when monetary compensations are possible. Second, we propose a new family of mechanisms for the provision of an excludable public good and discuss the relationship between the maximal welfare loss and maximal manipulation. Third, we investigate mutual evaluation mechanisms that satisfy monotonicity and unanimity.

Research Products

• [Journal Article] Exclusion of SelfEvaluations in Peer Ratings: Monotonicity versus Unanimity on Finitely Restricted Domains (2012)
  • Author(s): 大瀬戸真次
  • Journal Title: Social Choice and Welfare Volume: 38巻、1号 Issue: 1 Pages: 109-119
  • DOI: 10.1007/s00355-010-0521-2
  • Peer Reviewed
• [Journal Article] α-Serial Mechanisms for the Provision of an Excludable Public Good (2010)
  • Author(s): 大瀬戸真次
  • Journal Title: Japanese Economic Review Volume: 61巻、4号 Issue: 4 Pages: 507-516
  • DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5876.2009.00496.x
  • Peer Reviewed
• [Journal Article] α-Serial Mechanisms for the Provision of an Excludable Public Good (2010)
  • Author(s): 大瀬戸真次
  • Journal Title: Japanese Economic Review 61-4巻 Pages: 507-516
  • Peer Reviewed
• [Journal Article] α-serial mechanisms for the provision of an excludable public good (2010)
  • Author(s): 大瀬戸真次
  • Journal Title: Japanese Economic Review Volume: 61 Pages: 507-516
  • Peer Reviewed
• [Journal Article] Strategy-Proof and Symmetric Allocation of an Indivisible Good (2008)
  • Author(s): 安藤和敏、加藤美紀、大瀬戸真次
  • Journal Title: Mathematical Social Sciences Volume: 55巻、1号 Issue: 1 Pages: 14-23
  • DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.06.002
  • Peer Reviewed